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This Article contributes to the debate over mandatory arbitration of employment-
discrimination claims in the unionized sector. In light of the proposed prohibition
on union waivers in the Arbitration Fairness Act, this debate has significant prac-
tical implications. Fundamentally, the Article is about access to justice. It examines
160 labor arbitration opinions and awards in employment-discrimination cases.
The author concludes that labor arbitration is a forum in which employment-dis-
crimination claims can be-and, in some cases, are-successfully resolved. Based
upon close examination of the opinions and awards, the Article recommends legis-
lative improvements in certain cases targeting statutes of limitations, compulsory
process, remedies, class actions, discovery, and a union's duty of fair
representation.
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INTRODUCTION
Equal access to justice is one of the fundamental bases upon
which our legal system is founded. Ever since the Supreme Court's
1991 decision in Gilrmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation,' schol-
ars have criticized the Court's employment-law jurisprudence for
denying employees access to courts. As a result of decisions in Gil-
mer and related cases, employers may require employees to sign an
agreement to arbitrate any dispute that later arises with regard to
their employment. Scholars have objected to this mandatory arbi-
tration policy on a variety of grounds, including unequal
bargaining power between employees and employers and lack of
transparency in arbitration proceedings.2 Others have responded
that arbitration, being less costly, actually provides employees more
access to justiceA
A microcosm of this larger dispute arises in the unionized sector.
The Supreme Court recently decided in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett4 that
unions can waive individual employees' rights to file claims for stat-
utory violations in court. This means, for instance, that an
individual claiming racial discrimination against an employer may
have to arbitrate the claim in an informal grievance-arbitration pro-
ceeding rather than have a day in court. Understandably, the
1. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
2. See e.g., Jean R. Stemlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 SrAN. L. REv.
1631 (2005).
3. See e.g., Theodore J. St Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration: Why It's Better Than It Looks, 41
U. MicH. J.L. RzEoRm 783, 810 (2008).
4. 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 274 (2009).
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decision has caused much uproar, and union and plaintiffs' attor-
neys alike have condemned the decision.
Legislative fixes for the perceived problem of unfair mandatory
employment arbitration have been proposed. A federal bill, the Ar-
bitration Fairness Act (AFA), is currently pending in Congress.5
The AFA would prohibit mandatory predispute arbitration of em-
ployment claims altogether. The current version of the AFA
explicitly states that a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) may
not waive an employee's right to seek judicial enforcement of a stat-
utory right.6
Amidst this debate, little study has been devoted to the opinions
of labor arbitrators deciding employment-discrimination claims in
the union sector.7 This Article contributes to the body of scholar-
ship on the mandatory predispute arbitration of employment-
discrimination claims by looking closely at the opinions and awards
in labor arbitrations arising from CBAs. It examines 160 opinions
and awards of labor arbitrators involving disability or other discrimi-
nation claims. The Article concludes that labor arbitration can, and
sometimes does, ensure access to justice in employment-discrimina-
tion cases. It also suggests that the process of labor arbitration of
employment-discrimination claims can be improved to ensure ac-
cess to justice by regulating, in some cases, statutes of limitations,
compulsory process, remedies, class actions, discovery, and a
union's duty of fair representation.
This Article thus contributes to the debate epitomized by Jean
Sternlight's seminal article, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?
In reaching its conclusion, this Article draws on the larger body of
5. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011); Arbitration Fair-
ness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); see also Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931,
111th Cong. (2009); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); Preserva-
tion of Civil Rights Protections Act of 2005, H.R. 2969, 109th Cong. (2005).
6. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. § 402(b) (2) (2011); Arbi-
tration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. § 402(b) (2) (2011).
7. Cf Sarah Rudolph Cole, Let the Grand Experiment Begin: Pyett Authorizes Arbitration of
Unionized Employees' Statutory Discrimination Claims, 14 Lwis & CLARK L. REv. 861, 863 (2010)
(noting that there are fewer studies of labor arbitration than individual employment arbitra-
tion); Alan Hyde, Labor Arbitration of Discrimination Claims After 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett: Letting
Discrimination Defendants Decide Whether Plaintiffs May Sue Them, 25 OHio ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
975, 1014 (2010) ("In fact, there are very few studies of labor arbitration of statutory issues.");
Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Employment Arbitration: Keeping It Fair, Keeping It Lawful 60
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 629, 640 (2010) (comparing win rates in labor just-cause cases to em-
ployment arbitration and citing studies comparing how labor and employment arbitrators
treat hypothetical scenarios).
8. See Sternlight, supra note 2.
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literature on unions, collective action, and self-governance. 9 While
it attempts to make accurate mathematical representations, the Ar-
ticle does not aim to be a definitive empirical study.10 And, as with
most articles in the field, the arbitration awards surveyed cannot
claim to be a representative sample of all labor arbitration of
employment-discrimination claims.1 Instead, the Article seeks to
show what is happening in some labor arbitrations of some employ-
ment-discrimination claims and to suggest what is possible in
others, particularly if required by regulation.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides necessary
background, including a description of the perceived problem that
mandatory predispute arbitration creates in cutting off access tojus-
tice, the governing case law, and the resulting scholarly debate over
the appropriateness of mandatory predispute arbitration of employ-
ment-discrimination claims in the union setting. Part II describes
the methodology that the research team used to acquire the arbitra-
tion awards analyzed herein. Part III analyzes these opinions and
awards, exploring three categories of concerns about mandatory ar-
bitration by examining the opinions and awards. These categories
are procedural protections, substantive outcomes, and the union
and its processes. The analysis is largely subjective, although some
indicators, such as win/loss rates, are reported in a systematic nu-
merical manner. Section IV uses the analytical framework
developed from a review of the cases to offer preliminary sugges-
tions about an appropriate response to the perceived problem of
9. See, e.g., CvNristA ESTLtJND, WORKING TOGETHER: How WORKPLACE BONDS
STRENGTHEN A DIVRSE DEMOCRACY (2005); Archibald Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bar-
gaining Agreements, 57 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1958); David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 663 (1973).
10. Collaboration with a social scientist or statistician to review this data would be an
opportunity for further fruitful research. For instance, a sociological study examining the
different education and training that labor and employment arbitrators receive, and how
that training and the different processes affect outcomes under the employment discrimina-
tion statutes, may be warranted. Cf Shauhin A. Talesh, How Organizations Shape the Meaning of
Law: A Comparative Analysis of Dispute Resolution Structures and Consumer Lemon Laws (work in
progress) (comparing how different training and processes used for arbitration of lemon law
claims affect outcomes). A study integrating data on the labor arbitrator's characteristics,
such as gender, race, religion, and educational background, including J.D., might also be
warranted. Additionally, exploration of other data on labor arbitration of discrimination
claims (such as from the CCH or AAA databases) might support or contradict the conclu-
sions drawn herein.
11. See e.g., Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Out-
comes and Processes, 8J. EMPiRicAL LEGAL STr. 1, 2 (2011); Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth
Hill, Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 Disp. RESOL. J.
44, 45 (Nov. 2003/Jan. 2004); see also Part II, infra.
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mandatory predispute arbitration of employment-discrimination
claims in the union sector. 12
I. BACKGROUND
This Part provides the background necessary to understand the
Article's analysis on the debate over requiring unionized employees
with discrimination claims to proceed to labor arbitration. It first
contextualizes the debate by providing general information about
labor arbitration and mandatory predispute arbitration and
describing the perceived problem of lack of access to justice in
court. Next it describes the major court decisions permitting
mandatory arbitration of employment disputes. This Part then
fleshes out the contours of the scholarly debate over the appropri-
ateness of mandatory predispute arbitration of employment-
discrimination claims in the union setting. Finally, this Part
describes proposals for legislative fixes or self-regulation.
A. Mandatory Arbitration and Labor Arbitration Described
"Mandatory arbitration" describes an arrangement where two
parties considered to have unequal bargaining power agree before
any dispute to arbitrate claims rather than take them to court. The
agreement provides that the arbitrator's opinion and award will be
binding and reviewable only upon certain limited grounds. 13 In the
nonunion context, some employers require an employee to sign a
mandatory arbitration agreement as a condition of either hire or
continued employment. One recent study estimates that a third or
more of nonunion employees are subject to mandatory arbitration
of employment claims.' 4 Such arbitration is a relatively recent devel-
opment. The Federal Arbitration Act governs its processes.' 5 As
discussed more extensively below, scholars have objected to
12. This framework may serve as the foundation for further exploration and explication
of these preliminary recommendations in a subsequent article.
13. See William B. Gould, IV, Kissing Cousins?: The Federal Arbitration Act and Modem Labor
Arbitration, 55 EMORY L.J. 609, 647 (2006) (describing grounds for review).
14. Colvin, supra note 11, at 1-2.
15. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governs employment relationships outside the
union context. In the union setting, Section 301 of the Labor Relations Management Act
(LRMA) generally governs. The interplay of these two acts in cases of mandatory arbitration
of employment-discrimination claims remains to be seen. See Michael H. LeRoy, Irreconcilable
Differences? The Troubled Marriage ofJudicial Review Standards Under the Steelworkers Trilogy and
the Federal Arbitration Act, 2010 J. Disp. RFSOL. 89, 91-92 (2010).
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mandatory arbitration of employment claims, particularly employ-
ment-discrimination claims, on a variety of grounds. Their primary
objection is that mandatory arbitration denies employees their day
in court.
The term labor arbitration describes an arrangement where a
union and an employer agree in a CBA to resolve disputes over the
meaning of the CBA in a grievance process that culminates in bind-
ing arbitration. The initial steps of the process are often informal
exchanges between the union and the employer with informal doc-
ument exchange and discussion of the meaning of the contract.
Similar to mandatory arbitration in the nonunion sector, the arbi-
trator's decision and award is reviewable only upon certain limited
grounds. 16 Labor arbitration of contractual disputes is actually a
longstanding practice dating back to at least 1957.17 Historically,
however, an employee could file a statutory employment-discrimi-
nation claim in court as well as grieve a contractual violation
stemming from the same facts. 18 Recently, however, as discussed
more extensively below,19 the Supreme Court held that a union, as
the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees, may
agree with the employer that employees will arbitrate their employ-
ment-discrimination claims rather than take them to court. Similar
to the objections to mandatory arbitration in the nonunion sector,
scholars have objected to what might be termed "mandatory labor
arbitration" of employment disputes.
Labor arbitration of employment-discrimination claims warrants
study for several reasons. Unions represent more than sixteen mil-
lion employees in the United States, 20 meaning that labor
arbitration in the workplace has a widespread impact. Because un-
ions and employers may clearly and unmistakably agree that
employees must arbitrate rather than litigate statutory employment-
discrimination claims, it is useful to assess labor arbitration of
discrimination claims. Local 32BJ, the largest Service Employees In-
ternational Union (SEIU) local of property service workers,
arguably agreed to such a mandatory arbitration clause, indicating
16. Gould, supra note 13, at 647.
17. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (holding that specific per-
formance of an agreement to arbitrate between a union and an employer was properly
granted).
18. A contractual violation is a claim that an employer has violated a clause of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, typically the no-discrimination clause. A statutory claim contends
that an employer has violated a statute.
19. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
20. Kathryn A. Sabbeth & David C. Vladeck, Contracting (Out) Rights, 36 FoRDHAM URB.
L.J. 803, 820 (2009) (citing Union Member Summary, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR (Jan. 28, 2009),
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm).
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that other unions, while they may be few in number, might also
agree to such waivers.21 Moreover, the American Arbitration Associ-
ation (AAA) recently instituted a Pyett panel-a group of arbitrators
with employment law experience-indicating that at least one of
the primary service providers anticipates a need to arbitrate such
claims.2
2
Even if the large majority of unions and employers do not agree
to waive employees' rights to go to court on statutory discrimina-
tion claims, many such claims will continue to be processed
through the grievance arbitration procedure. These claims may
never reach court.23 And, even when they do, courts vary widely in
the deference afforded to an arbitration decision under Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co.,24 discussed below.2 5 Indeed, the Pyett decision,
also discussed below,2 6 may mean more judges are inclined to give
great weight-or even preclusive weight-to an arbitration decision
resolving a discrimination claim that arises from the same facts.
2 7
Regardless of whether unions and employers explicitly waive the
right to go to court, the resolution of a substantial number of dis-
crimination claims will effectively be decided in labor arbitration.
As a result, it is useful to assess labor arbitration of discrimination
claims as a starting point for determining whether regulating such
arbitration is necessary and, if so, in what manner and
circumstances.
21. 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009); Who We Are, 32BJ SEIU, http://
www.seiu32bj.org/who-we-are/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2013).
22. Am. ARB. ASS'N, LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND ELECTIONS UIPDATE-ISSUE 6 (May 2011),
available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRST_-007039; Daily Labor Report:
News Archive June 1, 2011, 105-DLR C-3, available to subscribers at http://news.bna.com/
dlln/display/batch-print display.adp.
23. Claims may not reach court, because grievants who are potential plaintiffs do not
have the knowledge or funds to hire an attorney or pursue a claim.
24. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
25. See Martin H. Malin, Revisiting the Meltzer-Howlett Debate on External Public Law in Labor
Arbitration: Is it Time for Courts to Declare Howlett the Winner?, 24 LAB. LAw. 1, 20 (2008) ("Subse-
quent lower-court decisions, however, have substantially eroded Gardner-Denvees holding that
an employee who loses the grievance is entitled to de novo review on the statutory claim.");
Courtney Lamont Phelps, Lifting Gardner-Denver Footnote 21: The Heavy Burden to Give 'Appro-
priate Weight" to Arbitration Decisions on Subsequent Judicial Review (2011) (unpublished student
independent study paper) (on file with author) (outlining various ways courts have treated
arbitration awards in employment discrimination cases); infra note 28 and accompanying
text.
26. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
27. See Ann C. Hodges, Fallout From 14 Penn Plaza, LLC v. Pyett: Fractured Arbitration
Systems in the Unionized Workplace, 2010J. Dsp. RESOL. 19, 51-52 (2010) ("A few lower courts
have read yett broadly, precluding litigation or deferring to the arbitration, in contradiction
to Gardner-Denver, which refused to do either.") (footnote omitted).
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B. The Governing Case Law Develops
CBAs often contain provisions that prohibit employers from dis-
criminating on the basis of union membership or activity or on
statutorily protected grounds including race, sex, and religion. The
shorthand term "no-discrimination clause" is often used to refer to
such provisions. After the enactment of the Civil Rights Act, a ques-
tion arose as to whether labor arbitration of an employment-
discrimination dispute precluded an employee from thereafter
proceeding to court with a related statutory claim.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue in the 1974 case Alexan-
der v. Gardner-Denver Co. 28 It held that arbitration of a dispute
alleging that a nondiscrimination clause was violated did not pre-
clude a later suit alleging violation of the statutory right to be free
of racial discrimination.2 9 The Court provided several rationales for
the holding. The Court noted that contractual rights are separate
and distinct from statutory rights30 and that labor arbitrators inter-
pret contracts rather than laws. 31 The Court reasoned that, based
upon longstanding precedent, labor arbitration is a substitute for
industrial strife and not for litigation.3 2 The Court concluded that
the labor-arbitration process is not suited to deciding discrimina-
tion claims3 3 and that the majoritarian tendencies of union
processes would not effectively protect statutory rights. 34 Thereaf-
ter, in other cases, the Supreme Court continued to hold that labor
arbitrations of contractual employment rights did not preclude
later suits claiming a violation of statutory rights based upon the
same underlying facts. 3 5 The Court concluded that labor arbitration
was an inadequate substitute for the courts in protecting statutory
rights.
36
In the nonunion sector, until the 1990s, employers rarely re-
quired mandatory arbitration of employment claims. This is
28. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
29. Id. at 51-52.
30. Id. at 52.
31. Id. at 53.
32. Id. at 54-55.
33. Id. at 57-58.
34. Id. at 58 n.19.
35. McDonald v. City of W. Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (holding that a Section
1983 action was not barred by unsuccessful arbitration of an alleged wrongful termination);
Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (holding that unsuccessfully
pursuing a wage claim before ajoint labor management committee does not preclude a Fair
Labor Standards Act suit).
36. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 290; see Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 731 n.4.
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because the FAA includes a provision historically interpreted to ex-
clude employment claims from its scope.37 But in the 1980s and
1990s, some employers began to mandate arbitration of employ-
ment claims, including discrimination claims.
The issue of whether such mandatory arbitration agreements
were enforceable reached the Supreme Court in 1991 in the case of
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.38 The Supreme Court held
that the FAA did not exclude arbitration of statutory employment
disputes from its scope. The policy of enforcing arbitration agree-
ments embodied within the FAA required that Gilmer arbitrate his
statutory age-discrimination claim rather than proceed to court.39
The Court emphasized that arbitration was merely a change in fo-
rum and not a waiver of a substantive right,40 reasoned that the
public goals of deterrence and remediation could be furthered
through arbitration, 41 and noted that the security-industry arbitra-
tion under which Gilmer's dispute would be determined involved
impartial arbitrators, adequate limited discovery, written publicly
available awards, and unrestricted relief.42 The Court also rejected
the contention that inequality in bargaining power renders an arbi-
tration agreement unenforceable. 43 Gilmer's arbitration clause was
contained in a securities-registration application, not an employ-
ment contract, leaving open the possibility that arbitration under
an employment contract would not be mandated by the FAA. The
Supreme Court subsequently held, however, that the FAA does ex-
tend to mandatory arbitration clauses included in employment
contracts.
44
Thus, after Gilmer, employees in the nonunion sector could be
required to arbitrate their statutory employment-discrimination
claims despite the generally unequal bargaining power between an
employer and an individual employee. 45 On the other hand, be-
cause of Gardner-Denver and subsequent cases, it was unclear
whether employers could require their represented employees to
arbitrate rather than proceed to court on statutory discrimination
37. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) ("[N]othing herein contained shall ap-
ply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.").
38. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
39. Id. at 25.
40. Id. at 26.
41. Id. at 28.
42. Id. at 31-32.
43. Id. at 33.
44. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (holding that only
contracts for employment of transportation workers are exempted from the FAA's coverage).
45. Sabbeth & Vladeck, supra note 20, at 819.
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claims.46 This led to a situation where represented employees, who
had more equal bargaining power with their employers, arguably
could not agree through their exclusive representative to
mandatory arbitration of employment claims. It also led to a situa-
tion where, in at least one jurisdiction, employers could bypass the
exclusive representative and require individual employees in the
union sector to enter into mandatory arbitration agreements. 47
Bypassing the union arguably undermined the collective strength
of the employees.
48
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit required that em-
ployees arbitrate rather than litigate statutory discrimination claims,
despite Gardner-Denver.49 Then, in 1998, the issue of whether a
union could waive employees' rights to proceed to court on a statu-
tory claim of discrimination reached the Supreme Court in Wright
v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.50 The Supreme Court reaffirmed
the holding of Gardner-Denver that a CBA's inclusion of a standard
clause prohibiting discrimination on certain grounds does not
waive an employee's right to proceed to court on those same
grounds. 5' The Court saved for another day the issue of whether a
union and an employer could include a clear and unmistakable
waiver within a CBA that would bind an employee to arbitrate
rather than litigate a statutory discrimination claim .52
The Court finally squarely addressed the issue in the 2009 case of
14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, holding that, by including a clear and unmis-
takable waiver in the CBA, a union and an employer can require
employees to arbitrate rather than litigate their employment-dis-
crimination claims.53 The Court reasoned that an agreement to
46. See Rogers v. N.Y. Univ., 220 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2000); Bratten v. SSI Servs., Inc., 185
F.3d 625, 630-32 (6th Cir. 1999); Albertson's, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers
Union, 157 F.3d 758, 760-62 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 809 (1999); Brisentine v.
Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 522-27 (11th Cir, 1997); Harrison v. Eddy Pot-
ash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1451-54 (10th Cir. 1997), vacated on other grounds, 524 U.S. 947
(1998); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363-65 (7th Cir. 1997); Varner v. Nat'l
Super Mkts., Inc., 94 F.3d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1996).
47. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1999), enforced
on reh'g en banc, 248 F.3d 1312 (2000).
48. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 70 (1975) (not-
ing that a union has a legitimate interest "in not seeing its strength dissipated and its stature
denigrated" by subgroups bypassing the union's collective bargaining front); see alsoJ.I. Case
Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944) (discussing the negative impact of individual contracts on
the bargaining power of the union).
49. Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
50. Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
51. Id. at 80.
52. Id. at 82.
53. 556 U.S. 247 (2009).
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arbitrate employment claims falls within the subjects over which un-
ions have authority to bargain.54 It noted that arbitrators are
capable of performing statutory interpretation and deciding com-
plex factual issues and extolled the benefits of the streamlined
process. 55 The Court also addressed the argument regarding union
conflicts of interest by pointing out that the principle of majority
rule, resulting in collective strength, is the central premise of labor
law.5 6 It asserted that potential conflicts of interest between unions
and their members are better addressed by Congress than the
courts.5 And, indeed, the Court reasoned that the duty of fair rep-
resentation and potential liability under Title VII protect
discriminatees from unfair union treatment.5 8
Currently, Gardner-Denver controls the majority of situations
where the parties include only a general, standard, nondiscrimina-
tion clause in the CBA. Many employees in the union sector will go
to court on their statutory discrimination claims. But many others
may, as a practical matter, use labor arbitration to resolve disputes
over employment discrimination. Some will proceed in both fo-
rums, and if arbitration precedes litigation, the weight the courts
accord the arbitration opinion and award will continue to vary. In
other situations, however, the union and the employer will include
a clear and unmistakable waiver in the CBA. It is also possible, al-
beit unlikely, that an employer would be permitted to unilaterally
implement mandatory labor arbitration as part of a last final offer if
the union and employer cannot agree during collective bargaining.
Employees in units governed by a CBA that contains a clear and
unmistakable waiver will be bound to arbitrate rather than litigate
their statutory discrimination claims unless the union elects not to
pursue their claims in arbitration.
59
54. Id. at 256.
55. Id. at 268-69.
56. Id. at 271 ("Respondents' argument that they were deprived of the right to pursue
their ADEA claims in federal court by a labor union with a conflict of interest is therefore
unsustainable; it amounts to a collateral attack on the NLRA.").
57. Id.
58. Id. at 271-72.
59. See e.g., Veliz v. Collins Bldg. Serv., Inc., No. 10 Civ. 06615 (RJH), 2011 WL 4444498,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011) (dismissing without prejudice a discrimination claim for fail-
ure to attempt arbitration because the CBA would be unenforceable if it operated to prevent
plaintiff from asserting his statutory rights in arbitration); cf Johnson v. Tishman Speyer
Properties, L.P., No. 09 Civ.1959(WHP), 2009 WL 3364038, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009)
(dismissing a discrimination claim and compelling arbitration where an employee "concedes
that he declined to pursue his grievance").
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C. Scholarly Debate on Mandatory Arbitration of Employment-
Discrimination Claims
Scholars and others object to mandatory labor arbitration of em-
ployment-discrimination claims on many grounds, which can be
categorized into three broad areas. The first two apply equally to
mandatory arbitration of employment-discrimination claims in the
nonunion sector, while the third applies particularly in the union
sector. All three type of objections somewhat overlap. First, schol-
ars object that procedural due process in arbitration is inadequate
or, at the very least, that there is no requirement that a fair process
be utilized in arbitration. Second, they object that the substantive
outcomes in arbitration are less advantageous to discriminatees
than those in litigation. Third, scholars make particular objections
to the use of the labor-arbitration process to resolve employment-
discrimination claims. They argue that unions and labor arbitrators
are adept at contract interpretation but are not trained in the legal
analysis necessary to interpret statutes. They also object that unions
have a history of discrimination and therefore should not be relied
upon to represent the interests of minority employees, or that the
majoritarian process upon which collective bargaining and the
grievance process rest will systematically serve majority interests
over minority interests.60 Fundamentally, the objections express
that arbitration deprives employees of equal access to justice.
As to procedural due process, scholars point out that the prac-
tices that make arbitration more efficient and less time consuming6
also cause arbitration to have fewer procedural protections than liti-
gation. Some argue that cost savings are largely a result of
decreased due process.62 They point out the inapplicability of the
rules of evidence and the lack of discovery, compulsory process,
60. Mark Berger, A Step Too Far: Pyett and the Compelled Arbitration of Statutory Claims
Under Union-Controlled Labor Contract Procedures, 60 SYRACUSE L. REv. 55, 84 (2009) ("The law
allows claims to be dropped for reasons related to the larger interests of the collective bar-
gaining unit as a whole, including the union's need to conserve scarce resources."); Alan
Hyde, Labor Arbitration of Discrimination Claims After 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett: Letting Discrimina-
tion Defendants Decide Whether Plaintiffs May Sue Them, 25 OMO ST.J. ON Disp. RESOL. 975, 1016
(2010) ("While some, perhaps most, unions are vigorous opponents of employment discrimi-
nation, some still engage in the practice."); Deborah A. Widiss, Divergent Interests: Union
Representation of Individual Employment Discrimination Claims, 87 IND. L.J. 421, 424 (2012)
("However, discrimination in the workplace-by unions as well as by employers-remains
real and common.").
61. Cole, supra note 7, at 862 & n.5.
62. Sabbeth & Vladeck, supra note 20, at 830; David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbi-
tration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 241-42 (2012).
800 [VOL. 46:3
Arbitration of Employment-Discrimination Claims
cross-examination, and testimony under oath. 63 Others point to re-
duced statutes of limitations and unavailability of class actions as
hindrances to due process.64 In particular, one study has demon-
strated that in nonunion employment arbitration, the number of
pro se litigants is high.6 5 Lack of legal representation may inhibit
discriminatees' success in pursuing meritorious claims, particularly
when the employer is represented. Additionally, in light of the Su-
preme Court's recent decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
employers may be able to include class-action waivers in mandatory
arbitration clauses, thereby depriving employees of the ability to
pursue low-value claims in arbitration or, indeed, at all. 66
As to substantive outcomes, objectors argue that discriminatees
are less likely to win in arbitration, and that when they do, the
awards are lower.6 7 They may be less likely to win because employers
who engage in arbitration multiple times have a knowledge advan-
tage or because arbitrators tend to favor employers who appear
before them multiple times.68 Arbitrators are also not empowered
to grant the full range of relief available under the antidiscrimina-
tion statutes, and thus damages may be limited. 69 These scholars
argue that low awards resulting from mandatory arbitration remove
6 3 . See, e.g., Suzette M. Malveaux, Is it the "Real Thing"? How Coke's One-Way Binding Arbi-
tration May Bridge the Divide Between Litigation and Arbitration, 2009 J. Disp. RESOL. 77, 84
(2009); Margaret L. Moses, The Pretext of Textualism: Disregarding Stare Decisis in 14 Penn Plaza
v. Pyett, 14 LEwis & CLARK L. Rav. 825, 846 (2010).
64. Hodges, supra note 27, at 37; Malveaux, supra note 63, at 84.
65. Colvin, supra note 11, at 16 (finding 24.9 percent of plaintiffs in individual AAA
administered employment arbitrations were pro se).
66. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); cf. Theodore Eisenberg,
Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitra-
tion Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. RErORM 871 (2007)
(hypothesizing that firms use arbitration clauses in consumer contracts to preclude class ac-
tions rather than to promote fair dispute resolution). But see D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B.
No. 184 (2012) (holding that individually negotiated class action waiver violates the National
Labor Relations Act).
67. See Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 11, at 45 (noting that objectors claim that employees
win less often and receive lower awards in arbitration but presenting empirical evidence that
this is not true).
68. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMp. RTS. &
EMp. PoL'vJ. 189, 214 (1997); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil
Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. Rrs. L. Rrv. 29, 33 (1998); Samuel Estreicher & ZevJ. Eigen, The
Forum for Adjudication of Employment Disputes 9 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law Research Paper
No. 10-51, 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1656618; see also Lisa B. Bingham, On
Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitra-
tion Awards, 29 McGEORGE L. REv. 223, 239-44 (1998) [hereinafter Bingham, On Repeat
Players] (cataloguing potential explanations for repeat-player effect).
69. See Hodges, supra note 27, at 38 (noting "in traditional labor arbitration punitive
damages and attorneys' fees are not ordered except in unusual cases") (footnote omitted);
Sabbeth & Vladeck, supra note 20, at 812 (noting how arbitrators are often powerless to grant
certain types of relief, such as liquidated damages, costs, or attorney's fees); see also Katherine
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an incentive for employers to refrain from discriminating. They
contend that arbitrators are not qualified to decide issues of public
law and that the development of laws intended to benefit the public
should not be left to private dispute resolution, 70 which is often
confidential and deprives the public of information about the dis-
pute and its resolution.71 Scholars have therefore argued that an
important part of the fight against discrimination is public adjudi-
cation of claims, 72 and that arbitration is not a transparent process
because it is confidential and does not establish precedent.7 Schol-
ars assert for a variety of reasons that transparency is lacking,
including that "statutes ... play a minimal role in arbitrators' deci-
sions"; even written decisions "by and large remain unpublished
and unavailable"; and, even when publicly available, decisions are
heavily redacted.7 4 Others argue that the limited judicial review of
awards is problematic.
75
Some scholars believe that permitting a union to waive an em-
ployee's right to proceed to court on a statutory discrimination
claim is even more problematic than permitting individuals to waive
their own right to litigate.76 First, these scholars assert that, in the
case of individual waivers, an employer must provide clear notice to
an employee of the waiver, whereas the employee may not be aware
of the provisions of the CBA.77 Further, these scholars assert that
unions have a conflict of interest.78 They are the exclusive represen-
tative for all employees and must juggle the interests of different
Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract
of the 1990s, 73 DENv. U. L. REv. 1017, 1039-40 (1996).
70. See Stephen Plass, Private Dispute Resolution and the Future of Institutional Workplace Dis-
crimination, 54 How. L.J. 45, 47 (2010) (arguing that the private, confidential nature of
arbitration removes much of the deterrent effect that a public lawsuit has on workplace dis-
crimination); David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for
Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 Sr. L. REv. 1557, 1563 (2005).
71. Plass, supra note 70, at 47.
72. Sabbeth & Vladeck, supra note 20, at 805.
73. Id. at 806-07,
74. Id.
75. Malveaux, supra note 63, at 84; Moses, supra note 63, at 826, 846; Stone, supra note
69, at 1048-50.
76. One article argues that Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claims are particularly
ill-suited for labor arbitration. First, unions push employers to benefit the median rather
than marginal worker. Second, they are not competent to prove individuals are disabled and
have no expertise in proposing reasonable accommodations. Finally, they have a conflict of
interest when other employees are paying for any accommodations. Hyde, supra note 7, at
1006-07.
77. See Moses, supra note 63, at 837 ("CBAs are contracts between the union and man-
agement and, until Pyett, had never been interpreted to require an individual employee, who
is not a party to the contract, to give up the statutory right.., to bring a claim... in court.").
78. Deborah A. Widiss, Divergent Interests: Union Representation of Individual Employment
Discrimination Claims, 87 INm. L.J. 421, 421 (2012) ("My fear is that often, even for unions
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groups. Unions are governed by majority rule, and thus may not
effectively represent the interests of minorities protected by antidis-
crimination statutes.79 They may bargain away rights protected by
public law to gain something of benefit to the majority of employ-
ees. Some even claim that unions poorly manage contract
grievances and will be unable to effectively handle the added bur-
den of discrimination claims.80
Moreover-and somewhat overlapping with due process con-
cerns-the labor-grievance-and-arbitration system is designed to
resolve disputes over contract interpretation, not statutory discrimi-
nation claims.8 The initial steps are often informal exchanges
between the union and the employer, with informal document ex-
change and discussion of the meaning of the contract. Unions and
labor arbitrators are considered experts in contract interpreta-
tion,8 2 and the arbitrator is viewed essentially as an agent of the
parties who understands their particular workplace and relation-
ship, rather than as a source of uniform law. Indeed, scholars point
out that many labor arbitrators do not have legal training and are
not skilled at statutory interpretation. 3 Some have asserted that ar-
bitrators are less skilled than judges in interpreting statutes, which
arguably are more complex than contractual provisions.8 4 Finally,
some worry that unions, which have historically discriminated
against minorities, women, and others protected by statutory em-
ployment laws, will continue to do so by not vigorously pursuing
meritorious statutory claims to labor arbitration.
Other scholars respond that arbitration saves cost and time85 and
provides an adequate level of procedural protection. Particularly in
acting in good faith, the interests of unions and individual employees will diverge-and that
individual employees who are victims of discrimination will be the losers.").
79. See Mark Berger, A Step Too Far Pyett and the Compelled Arbitration of Statutory Claims
Under Union-Controlled Labor Contract Procedures, 60 SYRACusE L. Rxv. 55, 83-84 (2009).
80. Hyde, supra note 7, at 1013 ("Unions are beleaguered and can hardly maintain com-
petent levels of processing grievances limited to violations of collective bargaining
agreements.").
81. See Sabbeth & Vladeck, supra note 20, at 820 (noting that employees select a union
to bargain over wages and conditions of employment but not to waive their rights to pursue
antidiscrimination claims).
82. See Hodges, supra note 27, at 35 ("[U]nion officials. . . are not trained in statutory
interpretation or litigation.").
83. SeeWilliam B. Gould IV, A Half Centuly of the Steelworkers Trilogy: Fiy Years of Ironies
Squared, in ARBITRATION 2010: Tr STEELWORKERS TRiLOGy AT 50, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTv-
THi.D ANNUAL MEETING OF TE NATnONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 65-66 (Paul D.
Staudohar & Mark I. Lurie eds., 2011) (citing lack of training in interpreting Title VII for
National Academy of Arbitrator members); Stone, supra note 69, at 1036.
84. See Sabbeth & Vladeck, supra note 20, at 811.
85. Sherwyn, supra note 70, at 1578; Theodore J. St Antoine, Gilmer in the Collective
Bargaining Context, 16 OHo ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 491, 499 (2001); see also David B. Lipsky,
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labor arbitration, awards are generally accompanied by a support-
ing opinion; parties are represented, though not always by an
attorney; witness testimony and documentary evidence are
presented; witnesses are cross-examined; post-hearing briefs are
often submitted; and transcripts are sometimes made. 86 Further-
more, "[h]uman resources representatives and union business
agents are almost as likely as their lawyers to use transcripts and
briefs, to challenge evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses."87 It is
arguably less expensive for employees, who do not have to hire in-
dependent counsel to represent them, since the service is provided
as part of the cost of union dues.88 Some consider the ability to
proceed pro se to be a benefit rather than exhibiting a lack of fair
process. 89 In any event, in labor arbitration, the union is likely to
cover the cost of the attorney or to provide a union representative
who is versed in workplace law. As to concerns about limited discov-
ery, one scholar suggests that unions are able to negotiate adequate
discovery90 while others recognize that legislation permitting lim-
ited discovery91 and requiring no reduction of periods prescribed in
statutes of limitations92 is warranted.
These scholars respond to substantive concerns by arguing that
mandatory arbitration successfully resolves employment claims.
93
They reason that low-income employees can access arbitration
Ronald L. Seeber & J. Ryan Lamare, The Arbitration of Employment Disputes in the Securities
Industry: A Study of FINRA Awards, 1986-2008, 65 Disp. RESOL. J. 12 (2010).
86. See WijsAm H. HOLLEY, KENNETH M. JENNINGS & ROGER S. WOLTERS, THE LABOR
RELATIONS PROCESS 483 (10th ed. 2011) (noting the use of cross-examination in labor arbitra-
tion); Dennis R. Nolan, Disputatio: "Creeping Legalism" as a Declension Myth, 2010 J. DisP.
RESOL. 1, 5 (2010) (parties are often represented by attorneys, arbitrators cite other awards as
precedent, objections to testimony and exhibits are made, and transcripts and briefs are uti-
lized); St. Antoine, supra note 85, at 509 (arguing that most labor arbitrators write reasoned
opinions "even in ordinary contract disputes") (footnote omitted); see also W. Mark C.
Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1895, 1910-11
(2010) (using labor arbitration as one example of an arbitration system that generates
precedent).
87. Nolan, supra note 86, at 7 (footnote omitted).
88. See Cole, supra note 7, at 863.
89. Estreicher & Eigen, supra note 68, at 9 (recognizing as positive the ability to proceed
pro se and suggesting revising protocol to ensure level playing field); see also Sherwyn et al.,
supra note 70, at 1575.
90. See Cole, supra note 7, at 872 n.67.
91. David SherwynJ. Bruce Tracey & ZevJ. Eigen, In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of
Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing Out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in
the Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMp. L. 73, 147 (1999); see also Martin H. Malin, The Arbitration
Fairness Act: It Need Not and Should Not Be an All or Nothing Proposition, 87 IND. LJ. 289, 312
(2012).
92. Malin, supra note 91, at 312; see also Sherwyn et al., supra note 91, at 135-36 (discuss-
ing the Model Arbitration Act).
93. See Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration
Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 777,
804 [VOL. 46:3
SPRING 2013] Arbitration of Employment-Discrimination Claims 805
more easily because it is a less costly option.94 Moreover, they sus-
pect that a large number of awards that are low but certain may
have a greater deterrent effect against employer discrimination
than a lesser number of awards that are high but uncertain. 95 In
favor of union arbitration of statutory employment discrimination,
some scholars cite the comparable win rates in arbitration and liti-
gation.96 Others note that arbitrators do cite other awards as
precedent.97 Some also point out that although private post-dispute
settlement does not result in a publicly accessible decision on the
merits, it is clearly lawful, and the courts will continue to develop
precedent in employment-discrimination cases. 98 In response to al-
legations that unfairness results from a repeat-player effect, they
assert that employers have an advantage when appearing multiple
times in litigation as well.99 And they assert that arbitrators have an
interest in "maintaining their established reputations for integrity
and neutrality."'100 Additionally, the risk that arbitrator bias or par-
ticipant expertise will result in a repeat-player effect in labor
arbitration is lower than with individual arbitration because unions,
like employers, are likely to appear multiple times in employment-
discrimination disputes. 101 At least one scholar supportive of
mandatory labor arbitration recognizes that changes are necessary
784, 805 (2003) (indicating her data tends to refute claims that employment arbitration can-
not competently resolve discrimination claims); cf Lipsky, supra note 85, at 59 (finding no
FINRA [Financial Industry Regulatory Authority] cases in a large sample where the arbitrator
"failed to adequately weigh employee claims of discrimination").
94. Hill, supra note 93, at 803-04; see also Gould, supra note 83, at 57 ("[L]ow income
employees are screened out of plaintiffs lawyers' offices in both wrongful discharge and fair
employment practice actions.").
95. St. Antoine, supra note 7, at 635.
96. Cole, supra note 7, at 862-63; see Sherwyn, supra note 70, at 1567-69.
97. See Nolan, supra note 86, at 5 (noting, in a different context, the commonly known
fact that labor arbitrators cite precedent).
98. Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1344, 1356 (1997); cf Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless, 40 Loy.
L.A. L. REv. 187, 209 (2006) ("[l]t is the rare case that contributes to the development of the
law in a significant way.") (footnote omitted).
99. See Stephen J. Ware, The Effects ofGilmer: Empirical and Other Approaches to the Study of
Employment Arbitration, 16 OIRo ST. J. ON Disp. REsoL. 735, 752 (2001) ("The most important
point about the repeat-player effect, however, is that this effect may be at least as prevalent in
litigation as in arbitration.") (foonote omitted).
100. Estreicher & Eigen, supra note 68, at 9.
101. Cole, supra note 7, at 863; Colvin, supra note 11, at 11; Maltby, supra note 68, at 33;
Richard A. Bales, The Discord Between Collective Bargaining and Individual Employment Rights:
Theoretical Origins and a Proposed Solution, 77 B.U. L. Rv. 687, 752-53 (1997); see also St.
Antoine, supra note 85, at 506.
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to ensure that full statutory remedies are available,'0 2 while another
acknowledges that expanding limited review is warranted.103
As to attacks on union waivers, even if an employer must provide
an employee in the nonunion setting with notice of mandatory ar-
bitration, that employee is unlikely to refuse and risk losing his
livelihood.104 On the other hand, a union has a more equal rela-
tionship with the employer and might decide to arbitrate, rather
than litigate, only in instances where doing so truly would benefit
employees.'0 5 Indeed, unions could carve out certain types of
claims, bargain for a different arbitration system with more proce-
dural safeguards, or provide individual grievants the right to
arbitrate outside the labor-arbitration process. 10 6 They could even
consider addressing discrimination and other statutory claims as a
service that they can provide to their members.'
0 7
Professor Sarah Cole draws on the cognitive-psychology literature
to argue that employees are better off relying on unions than on
themselves to make decisions about whether to waive a court forum
and what procedures to use in discrimination claims.'08 Some assert
102. St. Antoine, supra note 85, at 508-09; see also Malin, supra note 91, at 312.
103. Cole, supra note 7, at 879; cf LauraJ. Cooper, Employment Arbitration 2011: A Realist's
View, 87 IND. LJ. 317, 323-24 (2012) (arguing courts should impose more aggressive judicial
review in nonlabor employment arbitration).
104. See St. Antoine, supra note 85, at 503-04.
105, See St. Antoine, supra note 85, at 491. An employer should not be able to unilaterally
implement arbitration without the union's agreement. Waiver of Right to a Federal Forum, 123
Hxav. L. REv. 332, 340 (2009) ("The Court has already held that traditional grievance arbi-
tration provisions cannot be implemented to impasse, and this doctrine seems easily
applicable in the context of arbitration of statutory rights.") (footnote omitted).
106. Authors have recognized that the type of arbitration procedure may affect the ade-
quacy of the grievance-arbitration process to handle discrimination claims. For instance,
whether the individual employee has the ability to proceed to arbitration when the union
declines to do so, as the employees did in Pyet is an important consideration. See Steven C.
Bennett, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Impact of the Pyett Decision on Collective
Bargaining, 42 TEx. TEcH. L. REv. 23, 29 (2009); Mark S. Mathison & Bryan M. Seiler, What 14
Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett Means for Employers: Balancing Interests in a Landscape of Uncertainty, 25
A.B.A. J. L,%B. & EMP. L. 173, 193 (2010); see also Michael Z. Green, Reading Ricci and Pyett to
Provide RaialJustice Through Union Arbitration, 87 IND. LJ. 367, 412-13 (2012) (proposing
process with racially diverse, experienced arbitrator pool).
107. See Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor's Identity Crisis, 89 CAi. L. REv. 1767, 1843
(2001); Green, supra note 106, at 413. Scholars recognize that while it will be a challenge for
unions to devote time and resources to discrimination claims, to do otherwise abdicates their
responsibility to bargain over terms and conditions of employment. David L. Gregory & Ed-
ward McNamara, Mandatory Labor Arbitration of Statutory Claims, and the Future of Fair
Employment: 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 19 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. PoL'v 429, 452 (2010). Leaving
agreements to arbitrate to individual employees rather than the recognized union opens the
door to individual bargaining in the union setting and undermines the federal policy of
collective bargaining. Id.
108. Cole, supra note 7, at 902; Hill, supra note 93, at 784 (indicating her data tends to
refute claims that employment arbitration cannot competently resolve discrimination
claims).
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that arbitrators are equally as experienced and qualified as judges
to interpret antidiscrimination statutes and decide such claims.'M
Indeed, to the extent that labor arbitrators are required to special-
ize in employment law and understand the workplace, it is
conceivable that they are better qualified than generalist judges to
decide employment-discrimination claims." 0 As a factual matter,
"almost all labor arbitrators regularly face and decide legal
questions.""'
As to the possibility of union conflict with those discriminated
against, some assert that unions today are "staunch advocates of tra-
ditionally underrepresented groups."" 2  Some scholars have
suggested that the antidiscrimination laws themselves and the duty
of fair representation serve as adequate safeguards.""' Others have
pointed out that concerns about unions refusing to process merito-
rious claims may be satisfactorily addressed in several ways. First, the
courts should hold, as has the Southern District of New York, that
when a union refuses to bring a claim to arbitration, the employee
may proceed with the case in court." 4 Second, a statutory claim
under Title VII and the related statutes is available directly against
109. Cole, supra note 7, at 877-78; Gregory & McNamara, supra note 107, at 451; see also,
Patricia A. Greenfield, How Do Arbitrators Treat External Law ?, 45 INus. & LAB. REL. REv. 683,
686 (1992) (citing studies finding that labor arbitrators are aware of and comply with Title
VII); cf Malin, supra note 91, at 313 (proposing regulating arbitration services' process for
selecting neutrals).
110. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L.
REv. 885 (2003) (arguing that expert administrative agencies should be given freedom to
depart from statutory language and from engaging in formalism, but that generalist judges
should be bound to formalism to reduce errors). But see Hyde, supra note 7, at 984 ("There is
no reason to think that labor arbitration can suddenly turn into a kind of labor court, or
master labor institution to resolve statutory and common law claims beyond its competence
or experience.") (footnote omitted).
111. Nolan, supra note 86, at 11.
112. Cole, supra note 7, at 864; see also Hyde, supra note 7, at 1016 (conceding that most
unions vigorously oppose discrimination but noting that some still discriminate).
113. See Cole, supra note 7, at 886.
114. Veliz v. Collins Bldg. Serv., Inc., No. 10 Civ. 06615(RJH), 2011 WL 4444498, at * 4
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011) (dismissing discrimination claim without prejudice because CBA
will be unenforceable if it operates to preclude arbitration); Morris v. Temco Serv. Indus.,
Inc., No. 09 Civ. 6194(WHP), 2010 WL 3291810, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2010) (denying
motion to compel arbitration where union failed to pursue discrimination claim); Borrero v.
Ruppert Hous. Co., Inc., No. 08 CV 5869(HB), 2009 WL 1748060, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 19,
2009) (dismissing complaint without prejudice "because if" plaintiff "is prevented by the
Union from arbitrating his claims, the CBA's arbitration provision will not be enforceable.");
Kravar v. Triangle Serv., Inc., 186 L.R.R.M. 2565 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2009) (denying a motion
to compel arbitration because union refused to arbitrate disability claim, and the CBA,
thereby, precluded the plaintiff from raising her disability claim in any forum); cf. Johnson v.
Tishman Speyer Prop., L.P., No. 09 Civ. 1959(WHP), 2009 WL 3364038 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16,
2009) (dismissing discrimination claim and compelling arbitration where employee "con-
cedes that he declined to pursue his grievance").
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any union that itself engages in discrimination.' 15 Alternatively,
though perhaps less satisfactorily, the breach of duty of fair repre-
sentation claim is available to aggrieved employees." 6
D. Proposals to Provide a Fair Forum to Discriminatees
To address the problems recognized by scholars who oppose an
unregulated arbitration process, many bills have been introduced
in Congress that would prohibit mandatory arbitration, including
mandatory arbitration of employment claims.1 7 A few of these bills
have passed, including The Department of Defense Appropriations
Act of 2010, prohibiting the use of mandatory arbitration of Title
VII and related employment claims by any employers contracting
with the federal government." 8
Most recently, on May 12, 2011, Senator Al Franken introduced
the AFA in the Senate, and Representative Henry Johnson intro-
duced the same measure in the House." 9 The AFA would prohibit
mandatory arbitration of consumer, civil rights, and employment
disputes.120 While the AFA explicitly permits labor arbitration pur-
suant to a CBA, it provides that "no such arbitration provision shall
have the effect of waiving the right of an employee to seek judicial
enforcement of a right arising under a provision of the Constitu-
tion of the United States, a State constitution, or a Federal or State
statute, or public policy arising therefrom."'2 ' It would thus reverse
115. St. Antoine, supra note 85, at 504-05.
116. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S.
192 (1944). Unions are concerned that more employees will bring duty of fair representation
claims if they agree to waive statutory rights. See Brendan D. Cummins & Nicole M. Blissen-
bach, The Law of the Land in Labor Arbitration: The Impact of 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 25 ABA
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 159, 171 (2010) ("The duty of fair representation risk is greater in the
context of civil rights claims than for ordinary grievances not only because of the sensitive
subject matter but also because of the complexity of the legal claims. The risk may also be
heightened when the union has agreed to foreclose alternative remedies."). Some scholars
maintain, however, that with or without the waiver, unions remain susceptible to these
claims. See Gregory & McNamara, supra note 107, at 452.
117. See E. Gary Spitko, Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers from Legislation
Invalidating Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 43 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 591,597 (2009);
Thomas V. Burch, Regulating Mandatory Arbitration, 2011 UTAH L. lEv. 1309, 1132.
118. Burch, supra note 117, at 1334. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act prohibits mandatory arbitration of securities whistleblower provisions. See
Malin, supra note 91, at 289.
119. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011); Arbitration Fair-
ness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011).
120. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011); Arbitration Fair-
ness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011).
121. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, HR. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011); Arbitration Fair-
ness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011). The AFA had been introduced in prior terms as
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Pyett and prohibit mandatory labor arbitration of employment-dis-
crimination claims.
Another proposed solution is to regulate rather than prohibit
mandatory arbitration of employment claims. The first proposal
along these lines was known as the Due Process Protocol (Proto-
col).122 An alternative-dispute-resolution task force drafted the
Protocol as a form of self-regulation for arbitration services and
businesses to adopt.123 It has been partially implemented by the
AAA, one of the primary service providers for both employment
and labor arbitration. The AAA provides procedural protections
consistent with the Protocol in nonunion-sector mandatory employ-
ment arbitration. 24 The Protocol provides certain safeguards, such
as a jointly selected arbitrator, discovery, representation of the
grievant's choosing, remedies equivalent to those statutorily pro-
vided, and a written decision. 125 The Protocol, however, excludes
the unionized sector from due-process regulation, and so does not
govern a situation in which a union agrees to arbitrate discrimina-
tion claims rather than bring them to court.126 Currently, the AAA
"is considering the possibility of supplementing its Employment or
Labor Arbitration Rules" to address discrimination cases arbitrated
under Pyett.t 27 Similar proposals with additional or different proce-
dural safeguards have been offered over the years. 28 Others have
well, but not always containing the same language regarding union waivers of public law
rights.
122. TASK FORCE ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN EMPLOYMENT, DUE PROCESS PRO-
TOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARBIITRATION OF STATUTORY DISPUTES (1995), reprinted in 9A Lab.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) IERM 534:401 to :402 (Mar. 1996); see also Richard A. Bales, Beyond the
Protocol: Recent Trends in Employment Arbitration, 11 EMP. RTS. & Emp. POL'YJ. 301 (2007); Mar-
tin H. Malin, Due Process in Employment Arbitration: The State of the Law and the Need for Self-
Regulation, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'YJ. 363 (2007).
123. Bingham, On Repeat Players, supra note 68, at 229.




366%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Dtz95kvrf0_144 (last visited Dec. 30,
2012).
125. St. Antoine, supra note 7, at 641-42.
126. TASK FORCE ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN EMPLOYMENT, supra note 122, at
534:401; see also St. Antoine, supra note 7, at 644 (describing the National Academy of Arbitra-
tors' proposal).
127. See Am. ARB. ASS'N, LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND ELECTIONS UPDATE-ISSUE 6, at 3 (May
2011), available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_007039.
128. See Richard A. Bales, Normative Consideration of Employment Arbitration at Gilmer's
Quinceanera, 81 TUL. L. REv. 331, 391 (2006); Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due
Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 369, 438 (2004) (suggesting possibility of
external third party monitors); Bales, supra note 122, at 343; Malin, supra note 91, at 401-02
(urging arbitrators to enforce statutes of limitations and refuse to enforce clauses that reduce
the time a party has to file a claim).
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proposed that Congress mandate procedural protections rather
than prohibiting mandatory arbitration of employment claims
altogether.1
29
Thus, the options are to leave the law as it is, permitting largely
unregulated mandatory labor arbitration of employment-discrimi-
nation claims; to prohibit such arbitration altogether, thereby
reverting to a system where an employee may choose to pursue la-
bor arbitration and litigation; or to permit mandatory labor
arbitration only if it provides certain procedural safeguards. 3 0
While any of these options has its benefits and drawbacks, this Arti-
cle, after reviewing 160 arbitration opinions and awards, suggests
the latter approach is probably best. This Article also provides pre-
liminary suggestions for potential regulatory safeguards and
proposes further research to assess these potential safeguards.
II. METHODOLOGY
This Article contributes to the literature on mandatory arbitra-
tion of employment claims by providing a case study of labor-
arbitration awards published by the Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.
(BNA) between 1992131 and 2010.132 The research team searched
the database to find awards addressing claims under the Americans
with Disabilities Act or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, or discrimi-
nation claims, including disability accommodation claims. The
following four searches were performed: (1) "ADA" "Americans
with Disabilities Act" "disability discrimination" "accommodation";
(2) "Title VII" "race discrimination". "sex discrimination"; (3) "sex-
ual harassment"; and (4) "pregnancy discrimination. 1 33  The
129. See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of SetfRegulation, 105
COLUM. L. REv. 319, 403 (2005); Bales, supra note 122, at 343; Burch, supra note 117, at 1348;
Malin, supra note 91, at 311.
130. Of course, something other than arbitration or litigation might provide more satis-
factory outcomes for all involved.
131. 1992 was selected as the start date because the effective date of the ADA wasJanuary
26, 1992. The research team searched for Title VII and discrimination claims as far back as
the database permitted, with the earliest award dated 1981, but the author has not compiled
that data.
132. The BNA database is one of two large commercial databases that are traditionally
used by attorneys representing parties in labor arbitration and by the neutrals to research
their cases. The particular database searched is the BNA Labor Relations Reporter Labor
Arbitration Reports via LexisNexis Labor Arbitration Awards (Published and Unpublished).
The research team also searched the CCH database, the other large commercial provider of
arbitration awards, but the author has not yet compiled that data, which may provide the
basis for a future similar article.
133. A fifth search "ADEA" "Age Discrimination in Employment Act" was also run but
returned only 35 awards, which are not relied on by this Article.
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research team retrieved 684 awards, 225 of which were responsive
to the first ADA-related search.
The author then sifted through the summaries provided by the
research assistants reading awards that appeared as though they
might be on point. Many of the awards retrieved involve cases
where the grievant was terminated for sexual harassment rather
than a grievant bringing a claim of discrimination; these are ex-
cluded from the ultimate case study, although they may shed light
on arbitrators' ability to interpret Title VII.134 A few opinions de-
cided that the discrimination claim was for the courts, and so the
claim was not resolved in arbitration. These are excluded as well.
Many other cases were off point, containing search terms only be-
cause they were part of quoted contractual language and not
because they formed the basis of the claim. Other off-point cases
were excluded because they contained search terms but were com-
pletely unrelated to the arbitration of discrimination claims.
Ultimately, the case study relies primarily on 160 awards, 101 of
which result from the first ADA-related search. These cases involve
claims for discrimination, retaliation, or failure to accommodate,
including claims for reverse discrimination and also claims in which
a nondisabled employee grieved losing some position or slot to a
disabled person. From time to time during the discussion of the
awards, other cases involving different types of claims are men-
tioned and cited.
The data, of course, do not represent a complete picture of what
actually occurs in arbitration. The sample cannot be considered
representative, and it is not a reliable basis for statistical analysis
because many labor-arbitration awards, although likely involving a
written decision, are not published by BNA. BNA relies on arbitra-
tors to seek permission from the parties and send awards to BNA
for publication. While unlikely, some labor arbitrators may not be
aware of the opportunity for BNA publication. Some arbitrators
elect not to publish any awards unless required to by the CBA.135
Others may seek permission to publish awards only when the deci-
sion relates to an open or high-profile issue, or concerns a case that
134. Perhaps this data will serve as the basis for a future article.
135. They possibly do so because they rule more often for employers or for unions and
do not wish that information to be publicly available. Because, however, both management
and union-side attorneys have networks of other attorneys that share unpublished decisions
and information about the reputation of arbitrators, the arbitrators likely do not have such a
motive. More likely, they may do so because they do not wish to charge for the time necessary
to write a polished, publishable decision or because they wish to keep the details of the case
confidential, particularly where the opinion states a particular witness was not credible. In
some regions, such as New England, there is a culture of nonpublication. No strong hypothe-
ses indicate that those who do not publish rule differently than those who do.
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would be useful to many companies or industries. Even those who
routinely seek permission to publish may not always obtain permis-
sion from both parties.
136
Thus, this Article provides a subjective case study of labor arbitra-
tion, and the conclusions reached are, therefore, tentative.
Certainly, some companies may continue to promulgate apparently
unfair policies, 137 and, while the risk they will do so is lower with
union representation, certainly it is not outside the range of
probability. However, this case study does demonstrate what is hap-
pening in a cross section of cases from different providers and
regions in labor arbitration of employment discrimination cases.
Moreover, this case study provides a view of what is realistically pos-
sible in labor arbitration, particularly if mandatory labor arbitration
of employment-discrimination claims was regulated in some man-
ner by federal legislation.
III. ANALYsis: WHAT THE AWARDs TELL US
This Part describes and analyzes the above-mentioned awards in
light of the previously discussed objections to mandatory labor arbi-
tration of employment-discrimination claims. 138  After briefly
describing the types of cases and where the hearings were held, the
following subsections discuss procedural concerns, substantive con-
cerns, and concerns that labor arbitration is even more ill-suited for
deciding employment-discrimination claims than mandatory em-
ployment arbitration.
Of the 101 ADA-related cases, seventy-six asserted a violation of
the ADA or a similar state statute either solely as a statutory viola-
tion or, in the majority of cases, because the statute was
136. When would a party elect not to publish? Perhaps employers who lose do not want a
discrimination finding to be publicized. Perhaps, but less likely, because grievant names are
often redacted, a grievant does not want private facts about losing a harassment or discrimi-
nation claim publicized. Why would a losing party ever agree to publication? Perhaps
precisely because the losing party or the party's attorney wishes the arbitrator's decision and
rationale to be widely available to others thinking of bringing or defending a similar case so
that they do not waste money doing so or so they can come up with different arguments than
those that failed. Perhaps the parties have a practice of not objecting to publication, the
arbitrator seeks permission at the outset of the arbitration before the parties know who has
won, or the arbitrator provides a form at the outset, which asks the parties to object to publi-
cation within thirty days after the award, and the parties forget to object.
137. See Sabbeth & Vladeck, supra note 20, at 828 ("[Sltudies relying on data from the
American Arbitration Association ... will necessarily under-represent unscrupulous employ-
ers or egregiously unfair arbitration provisions, because the AAA is a relatively reputable
organization, which as a matter of practice refuses to arbitrate under rules it deems unfair.")
(footnote omitted).
138. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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incorporated into the CBA. Twenty-five, including the ten cases
where an employee complained of a disabled employee's benefit,
asserted only a violation of a contractual provision such as a no-
discrimination clause, a just cause provision, or a seniority provi-
sion. Of the fifty-nine remaining discrimination cases, thirty-five
asserted a violation of Title VII or a similar state statute, while
twenty-four relied only on a contractual provision.
139
NUMBER OF AWARDS GIVEN BY STATE
KIT
The disputes arose and were arbitrated all across the country.
Thirty-six of the fifty states and the District of Columbia are repre-
sented among the 138 awards for which the location was
ascertainable. Every region is represented, with Ohio accounting
for seventeen cases, the most of any single state.
140
139. In these cases as well, the types of contractual clauses relied on were no-discrimina-
tion clauses, just cause provisions, and seniority provisions.
140. The breakdown of the 138 cases was as follows. AL(4), AK(3), AR(1), CA(15),
CO(4), FL(4), GA(3), IL(4), IN(2), IA(1), KS(4), KY(1), LA(3), MD(2), MI(8), MN(10),
MO(7), NE(1), NV(1), NH(1), NM(2), NY(3), NC(1), ND(2), OH(17), OK(4), OR(2),
PA(10), TN(2), TX(6), UT(1), VT(1), VA(2), WA(3), WV(1), WI(1) & DC(1).
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A. Procedural Protections in Labor Arbitration
This section reviews the process of labor arbitration of discrimi-
nation claims. It first reports the selection process for arbitrators,
which relates to which provider's rules, if any, governed the dis-
pute. Second, it reports the length of time taken to settle the
dispute, which relates to the efficiency and cost of the process. Fi-
nally, it reports data related to specific due-process protections.
1. Service Providers
The service provider handling the greatest number of claims was
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) with eighty
awards, approximately 50 percent of the total. 141 As to procedural
protections, the FMCS rules provide for a neutral arbitrator who is
not employed as an advocate, 142 an award within sixty days of the
close of the record, 143 and a "fair and adequate hearing" with the
opportunity to present evidence and argument.1 44
The AAA handled a substantial number of the claims, with
twenty-four awards, or approximately 15 percent of the total. 145 As
discussed above, the AAA rules incorporate the provisions of the
Protocol.146 Other services that handled at least one arbitration
were the California State Mediation and Conciliation Service, the
Michigan Employment Relations Commission, the Minnesota Bu-
reau of Mediation Services (BMS), the New York Public Employees
Relation Board (PERB), the Pennsylvania Bureau of Mediation
(PBM), the U.S. Department of Labor's Office of Labor-Manage-
ment Relations, the Vermont Labor Relations Board, and the
141. Fifty-two of the ADA search-related cases indicated the FMCS was the provider, while
31 of the other claims did so.
142. See FMCS Arbitration Services, 29 C.F.R. § 1404.5(c) (2011).
143. See id. § 1404,14.
144. Code oj 'rofessional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-Management Disputes of the: Fed-
eral Mediation and Conciliation Service, National Academy of Arbitrators, American Arbitration
Association, FED. MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERV. (June 2003), available at http://
www.fmcs.gov/internet/itemDetail.asp?categorylD=247&itemID-17942.
145. Fourteen of the ADA-search-related cases indicated the AAA was the provider, while
twelve of the other claims did so. Further exploration of the effect, if any, of different service
providers on outcomes or opinions may be warranted as may be exploration of any differ-
ences between public and private sector unions' claims.
146. See supra Part I.D.
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Washington Public Employment Relations Commission. 147 To-
gether, these services accounted for eleven cases, or approximately
7 percent of the total.
In the remaining forty-five cases, or approximately 28 percent of
the total, it was not possible to discern which service, if any, was
used. Unions and employers sometimes agree to a permanent
board or panel of arbitrators for the term of the contract. 148 It is
possible that many of these cases were handled by a neutral selected
from such a permanent panel and that others were mutually agreed
upon by the parties during the grievance process leading up to the
arbitration.
2. Time to Resolve
Arbitration is touted as a more efficient and less time-consuming
procedure for settling disputes than litigation.149 The opinions and
awards do not reflect the number of hours clients and their repre-
sentatives spent attempting to settle the dispute during the
grievance process or preparing for the arbitration. The conven-
tional wisdom is that fewer hours would be spent preparing for and
arbitrating a case than would be spent in litigation, the required
administrative processes preceding litigation, and at trial.150
Except in four instances, the decisions do reflect the length of
time it took to decide the dispute. For each dispute, the research
team calculated the number of days between the triggering inci-
dent-such as termination, suspension, request for
accommodation, or harassment-and the date of the award. In
three instances, the date of the triggering incident was not reflected
in the opinion, and the date of the filing of the grievance was used
147. The BMS, PERB, and PBM each handled two cases while all the other listed services
handled one.
148. See Thomas H. Oehmke &Joan M. Brovins, Arbitrator Selection and Service, 97 AM. Jura.
TRIALs 319, § 8 (2005) ("Some collective bargaining agreements (in the automotive and steel
industries, for instance) name a permanent panel of umpires who serve during the contract
term to resolve worker grievances. Other labor agreements might provide a list of arbitrators,
one of whom must decide the dispute. The practice of using one or more permanent arbiters
has extended to some large, complex commercial construction projects where disputes must
be resolved quickly.").
149. JAY FOLBERG ET AL., RESOLVING DispUTES: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND LAW 540 (2010)
("As compared to litigation, arbitration has traditionally been touted as a more efficient,
speedy, and inexpensive path to justice.").
150. Eisenberg and Hill, supra note 11, at 51.
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PERCENTAGE OF CASES HANDLED
* FMCS (Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service) - 80 awards
AAA (American Arbitration Association) - 24 awards
Other service providers - 11 awards
a Unknown - 45 awards4
instead.'-" The average length of time to obtain a decision was ap-
proximately 503 days. The median length of time was
approximately 398 days.' 52 Sixty-three cases, or approximately 40
percent, were decided in less than 365 days; 132, or approximately
85 percent, in less than 730 days; 148, or approximately 95 percent,
in less than 1095 days; 151, or approximately 97 percent, in less
than 1,460 days; and 154, or approximately 99 percent, in less than
1,825 days. Two cases took almost six years to resolve.
This average length of time is somewhat longer than ideal for an
expedited system. Yet the length of time between a termination or
other triggering incident and a court decision is probably, on aver-
age, longer. This is particularly true given that a claim must first be
filed with an administrative agency such as the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) before a complaint can be filed
in court.153 Indeed, studies have reported a longer average time
from filing a suit until a court decision, and that average does not
151. When only the month of the triggering event was known, the time was calculated
from the first day of the month.
152. Of ninety-nine ADA search related cases, the average number of days to decision was
approximately 480, and the median approximately 393. For the other fifty-seven cases, the
average was approximately 543 days, and the median approximately 449.
153. Colvin reports a mean time of 361.5 days from filing to decision in AAA individual
mandatory employment arbitration claims. Colvin, supra note 11, at 8.
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The cases studied lend support to the generally held understand-
ing that labor arbitration provides a number of due-process
protections. Generally, the practice in labor arbitration is to issue
written opinions and awards. Because of the database selected
(BNA), all of the awards studied were written and available via a
commercial database. Eight awards, or approximately 5 percent,
were unpublished, meaning that a large majority of the awards stud-
ied are available not only electronically but also in hard copy in
many law libraries. Labor arbitration appears to be relatively trans-
parent, with the name of the employer never being redacted. The
names of coworkers, supervisors, and members of management also
are sometimes published, although the grievant is typically identi-
fied only by an initial.
In labor arbitration, witnesses generally testify under oath and
are subject to cross-examination, parties are often represented by
counsel, grievants are almost always represented by some union
agent, transcripts are sometimes taken, and post-hearing briefs are
154. See Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 11, at 51 (reporting 709 day mean in federal court
on employment-discrimination claims and 723 day mean in state court on non-civil rights
claims).
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often submitted. Overall, a review of these cases indicates that the
process appears to be fair. The evidentiary and arbitrability rules
and lack of compulsory process do not appear to pose significant
hurdles to discriminatees. The lack of discovery, however, even if
not apparently unfair from a review of the opinions, does raise
some concern. The awards shed little light on the availability of
class-action procedures.
a. Witness testimony
Witness testimony is standard in labor arbitration, which gener-
ally proceeds like a trial with opening statements and then the
calling of witnesses. Witness testimony was expressly mentioned in
132 of the awards. Fifty-three of the opinions explicitly mentioned
that the grievant testified. While only six opinions explicitly men-
tion that the testimony was produced under oath, swearing in
witnesses is standard practice in labor arbitration. Cross-examina-
tion is also standard in labor arbitration, and nineteen cases
explicitly mentioned that the witnesses were subject to cross-exami-
nation. A minority of cases, discussed further below, indicated that
because a witness was unavailable, the opposing party did not have
the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. 155
b. Representation
In all cases except one, the union controlled the grievance pro-
cess and was the party represented at arbitration. In one case, an
employee, represented by counsel, alleged a violation of the CBA to
the Vermont Labor Relations Board without the assistance of a
union.156 Thus, none of the grievants represented themselves. As
155. See Dep't of Veterans Affairs Med. Ctr., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1571, 1573 (2007)
(Terrill, Arb.) (one witness for each side not present); L.A. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 112 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 733, 737 (1999) (Kaufman, Arb.) (employer argued it was not provided opportu-
nity to cross-examine author of medical reports);Johns Hopkins Bayview Med. Ctr., 105 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 193, 198 (1995) (Bowers, Arb.) (arbitrator notes that the employer relied
on hearsay because a witness did not testify); Cal-Compack Foods, 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
865, 867 (1995) (Oestreich, Arb.) (first-line supervisor who prepared report not available);
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 99 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 609, 611-12 (1992) (Goldberg,
Arb.) (employer argued could not cross examine grievant and union experts because not
testifying); U.S. Dep't of Labor, 98 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1129, 1133 (1992) (Barnett, Arb.)
(alleged harasser not at hearing); City of Berkeley, 94 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1198, 1201
(1990) (Bogue, Arb.) (decision maker left employment and not available); infra notes
196-197 and accompanying text.
156. Vt. Pub. Safety Dep't, 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 370, 371 (1993) (Toepfer, Arb.).
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discussed further below, a subjective reading of the cases indicated
that, almost invariably, the grievants were well represented by the
union. If one were not paying close attention while reviewing the
cases, one might surmise, based upon the competent representa-
tion, that attorneys represented the unions in the large majority of
cases. 157 In only eighty awards, or approximately 50 percent of the
cases, however, the awards indicated that the unions, representing
the grievant, were represented by counsel. 58 The awards indicated
that employers were represented by counsel in 123, or approxi-
mately 77 percent, of the cases. 159 Eleven awards, or approximately
7 percent, indicated only that the union was represented, while
forty-six awards, or approximately 29 percent, indicated that only
the employer was represented.
160
c. Transcripts and briefs
It is common practice in most areas of the country for the parties
to submit post-hearing briefs. Some parties, though perhaps not a
large number, ordinarily have the hearing transcribed. While most
of the awards did not indicate whether a transcript was taken or
whether post-hearing briefs were filed, some did. Four awards indi-
cated that a transcript was available, one explicitly indicated no
transcript was taken, 161 and another indicated a tape recording was
available only to the arbitrator and would be destroyed after the
157. For instance, in one case the arbitrator noted, "[i]n a presentation and brief which
display an excellent grasp of these legal principles, the Union asserts that the Grievant was
wrongfully denied 'three main jobs."' Bowater, Inc., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 382, 386
(2001) (Harris, Arb.).
158. Of the awards resulting from the first ADA-related search, forty-eight awards indi-
cated that the union was represented by an attorney, and seventy-four indicated that the
employer was represented by an attorney. In eight cases only the union was represented by
an attorney, while in thirty-two cases only the employer was represented. The union was rep-
resented by an attorney in thirty-six of the cases responsive to the other searches (excluding
the case with the individual grievant), and the employer in fifty-seven (including the case
with the individual grievant). There were three cases where only the union was represented
by an attorney, and eighteen where only the employer was represented by an attorney. These
numbers reflect that representation by an attorney was indicated; it is possible that an attor-
ney was present in some of the cases where the award did not explicitly so indicate.
159. The difference in representation rates is statistically significant with a p value of
< .0001. A p value of < .05 is considered statistically significant. A p value of .05 means the
difference could only happen by chance one in 20 times. See the appendix for the full statis-
tical analysis.
160. The difference is statistically significant with a p value of <.0001. See the appendix
for the full statistical analysis.
161. See City of Jackson, No. FMCS 04-05962, 2005 WL 1800127, at *1 (Apr. 22, 2005)
(Goldberg, Arb.).
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Counsel f50%) Counsel (77%,) (29)
decision was issued.162 One case indicated that the record consisted
of the arbitrator's notes and the exhibits, 163 from which it can be
inferred that no transcript was made. Forty awards explicitly indi-
cated that the parties submitted briefs. One award indicated that
the parties waived the submission of briefs and provided oral
summations instead.164 In one case, the employer submitted a post-
hearing brief, but the union representative gave an oral summation
in lieu of a brief.165
162. See Boise Cascade Corp., 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 223, 224 n.1 (1995) (Michelstet-
ter, Arb.).
163. Reister & Thermacher Co., 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 572, 573 (1996) (Weisheit,
Arb.).
164. Olin Corp., 103 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 481, 483 (1994) (Helburn, Arb.) (holding
that a more senior employee won in a claim for a job position over a disabled junior
employee).
165. Cont'l Cement Co., 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 829, 834-36 (1996) (Hilgert, Arb.)
(upholding termination of alcoholic employee for absences).
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d. Evidentiary and arbitrability rules
The rules governing arbitration are also sometimes criticized be-
cause rules of evidence may be enforced only loosely or short
statutes of limitations may be applied strictly. While it is not appar-
ent from the decisions whether the rules of evidence were used at
the hearing, the evidence generally appears to be of the type that
would be admitted at trial. There are some instances in which relax-
ation of the evidentiary rules is apparent.
While there may sometimes be issues involving admission of un-
reliable or prejudicial evidence in arbitration, no such evidentiary
problems were apparent in the majority of the cases surveyed. Two
cases from the early 1990s, which are earlier than the cases sam-
pled, illustrate the potential problem. In one, the union objected to
the admission of a document comparing the merits of the grievant,
who alleged sex discrimination, to the merits of the male employee
who was promoted instead.1 66 The arbitrator overruled the objec-
tion, reasoning that the document was not documentary evidence
but simply testimony of the managers in written form.1 67 The griev-
ance was denied.168 In the second, hearsay indicating that
coworkers were unable to understand the grievant, who had been
demoted allegedly because of his race, was admitted.169 Again, the
grievance was denied.1 70
Two cases illustrate the way in which arbitrators often address
potential evidentiary problems by drawing inferences against the
employer with regard to evidence that is not in highly reliable form.
For instance, in one case, the employer relied on hearsay as to what
measures were taken to help the grievants find appropriate posi-
tions. The arbitrator determined that, because the employer relied
on hearsay, it had not actually tried to find jobs and sustained the
grievance.' 71 In another case, the employer submitted a written re-
port by a first-line supervisor who did not testify. The arbitrator
considered that the union was unable to cross-examine the supervi-
sor and sustained the grievance.
1 72
166. TU Elec., 97 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1177, 1184 (1991) (Bailey, Arb.).
167. See id. at 1184.
168. See id.
169. Pac. Airmotive Corp., 95 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 777, 782 (1990) (Kaufinan, Arb.).
170. See id. at 784.
171. John Hopkins Bayview Med. Ctr., 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 193, 198 (1996) (Bow-
ers, Arb.).
172. Cal-Compack Foods, 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 865, 868 (1995) (Oestreich, Arb.).
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Indeed, relaxed evidentiary rules possibly result in the admissibil-
ity of information favorable to the discriminatees. 73 For instance,
in one case, the employer objected to medical reports submitted by
the union because the employer had no opportunity to cross-ex-
amine the doctor. The arbitrator, however, admitted the reports on
the basis that to do so is typical in arbitration. Ultimately the arbi-
trator sustained the grievance. 174 In another, the union submitted a
statement from a coworker who did not testify, and the arbitrator
sustained the grievance.
175
Employers sometimes asserted contractual time bars or other
limits on grievances. 176 In the majority of these instances, arbitra-
tors tended to find the claims arbitrable and proceeded to rule on
the merits. 77 For instance, in one case, the arbitrator held that al-
though many acts upon which the discrimination claim was based
occurred more than thirty days before the grievance was filed, the
173. Dennis Nolan and Rick Bales discussed this possibility during the discussion group at
the annual SEALS conference in 2011.
174. L.A. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 112 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 733, 737 (1999) (Kaufman, Arb.).
175. Dep't of Veterans Affairs Med. Ctr., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1571, 1583 (2007)
(Terrill, Arb.); see also Robin & Hass Tx. Inc., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 119, 122 (1999)
(Woolf, Arb.) (admitting statement of foreman for purpose of assessing credibility).
176. Some claims were barred because the arbitrator believed an administrative agency or
court was the appropriate venue rather than arbitration. These are not included in the
sample.
177. See e.g., City of Minneapolis, 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 558, 561 (2008) (Befort,
Arb.) (arbitrator rejects argument of untimely refusing to elevate form over substance); Cin-
cinnati Bd. of Educ., 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 837 (2006) (Murphy, Arb.) (finding
employer waived argument that grievance was untimely); Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 117 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 515 (2002) (Neas, Arb.) (not time barred because continuing violation);
Laporte Pigments, 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1, 3-4 (2000) (Marino, Arb.) (rejecting em-
ployer's waiver argument); Mead Prods. Div., 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1753, 1757-58
(2000) (Nathan, Arb.) (rejecting employer's waiver argument); Stark Cnty. Sheriff, 112 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1045, 1050 (1999) (Fullmer, Arb.) (finding grievance arbitrable); El Paso
Elec. Co., 109 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1086, 1090 (1998) (Allen, Arb.) (grievance timely); City
of Akron, 111 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 705, 709 (1998) (Franckiewicz, Arb.) (rejecting argu-
ment that untimely because oral meeting at step one sufficed); City of Tampa, 111 Lab, Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 65, 73-74 (1998) (Hoffman, Arb.) (arbitrator considers claim despite untimeli-
ness); Reister & Thesmacher Co., 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 572, 575 (1996) (Weisheit, Arb.)
(modification of grievance at step two not a bar); Bat. Sun Co., 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
892, 895 (1996) (Liebowitz, Arb.) (uncertainty in language arbitrable); Exxon Co., U.S.A.,
Baton Rouge Refinery, 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 846, 849 (1995) (Caraway, Arb.) (finding
that because union presented evidence of sex discrimination, a claim involving termination
due to disability was arbitrable); City of Kentwood, 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 49, 53 (1995)
(Lipson, Arb.) (arbitrable despite management rights clause); Henkel Corp., 104 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 494, 498-500 (1995) (Hooper, Arb.) (applying discovery rule and finding griev-
ance timely filed within required 180 days); Rodeway Inn, 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1003,
1013 (1994) (Goldberg, Arb) (grievant's failure to testify in earlier steps was not bar to griev-
ance); NASA Lewis Research Ctr., 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 909, 911 (1993) (Minni, Arb.)
(grievance timely filed).
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union's knowledge of the alleged discrimination-after investiga-
tion of those allegations and several others within the thirty-day
period-occurred within the thirty-day period.178 In only four in-
stances-approximately 3 percent of the awards-did the arbitrator
actually deny a grievance based on a short time limit provided for in
a CBA or a similar procedural bar. In one case, the grievance con-
cerned the failure to promote the grievant to a higher grade,
meaning a higher paid level. The arbitrator refused to consider the
allegation that race discrimination was the root cause of the griev-
ant's earlier transfer from his position at the higher grade level to a
position at a lower grade level. The union grieved once he was
transferred back to his original position, but at a lower grade level.
Because the grievant had not filed a grievance within fifteen days of
his supervisor's racist remark resulting in the original transfer, the
grievance, which did not arise until he was denied the reclassifica-
tion over two years later, was barred from arbitration. 179 In another,
the decision barred a claim alleging race discrimination because
the grievant had not timely filed a grievance within ten calendar
days of the time when the facts upon which the grievance was based
were reasonably available. In a case alleging refusal to accommo-
date a disability, the grievance was filed fifty days after the grievant
was denied reinstatement, rather than within the requisite five
working days.180 If the unions in these cases had waived the em-
ployee's right to go to court altogether, the arbitrators may not
have enforced the short grievance deadlines. Nevertheless, these
three cases do illustrate the potential difficulty of short filing dead-
lines in labor arbitration. In the fourth case, the decision found a
claim for unequal pay barred because it had not been sufficiently
raised by the union in the grievance steps leading up to
arbitration.18 '
Additionally, one case actually applied the longer 180-day statu-
tory limitation to bar much of a sex-discrimination claim. The
grievant was required to arbitrate her claim after the United States
178. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, VA Med. Ctr., 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 731, 733-34
(1993) (Curry, Jr., Arb.).
179. Coastal Sys. Station (Dep't of the Navy), 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 540, 546, 549-50
(2003) (Bendixsen, Arb.); see also Sloss Indus. Corp., 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 917, 918-19
(1994) (Allen,Jr., Arb.) (barring claim alleging, in part, race discrimination because grievant
had not timely filed grievance within ten calendar days of time when facts upon which griev-
ance was based were reasonably available).
180. Allegheny Co., 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1784, 1787 (2006) (Dissen, Arb.).
181. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 98 Lab, Arb, Rep. (BNA) 1129 (1992) (Barnett, Arb.); see also
Burnett & Sons, 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 743, 748 (1994) (Concepcion, Arb.) (finding that
grievant waived claim to pay by failing to record dates of alleged nonpayment).
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District Court for the Western District of Virginia dismissed her dis-
crimination suit for failure to exhaust her remedies under the CBA.
While the union had not earlier filed a sex-discrimination claim,
the employer permitted it to do so, and the statutory claim was arbi-
trated. The arbitrator declined to consider any evidence of
discrimination occurring more than 180 days before the filing of
the EEOC claim and found the sole incident during the permitted
period not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work
environment. And, while evidence of race discrimination was
presented, the decision found the union had waived the claim by
failing to raise it in a grievance or with the EEOC in a timely man-
ner. 8 2 Of course, a court in the Fourth Circuit possibly would have
ruled in substantially the same manner.
e. Discovery and compulsory process
Generally, labor arbitration is the culmination of a contractual
arrangement in which a grievance is filed and discussed between
the union and the employer at various steps. Only when a grievance
cannot be resolved earlier in the grievance process does the union
resort to arbitration, which is typically the last step of the process.
During the grievance process, the parties typically discover informa-
tion informally and exchange documents. In the private sector, the
National Labor Relations Act provides a right to information per-
taining to terms and conditions of employment, including
grievances.18 3 Unions often make a written request for information
to the employer, which is enforceable by filing a charge with the
National Labor Relations Board. While exact numbers were not
compiled, a reading of the opinions studied indicates that in the
large majority of the cases, the lower steps of the grievance process
were used. The type of information gathered in those lower steps
generally is not apparent from the opinions. Presumably, some of
the exhibits admitted by unions were obtained during the process,
While information requests resemble requests for production of
documents, other discovery tools widely used in litigation, such as
interrogatories and depositions, are not generally available in labor
arbitration. Similarly, while labor arbitrators can subpoena wit-
nesses 84 and documents, enforcement is not always possible. In
182. Westvaco Corp., II1 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 887, 892 (1998) (Nicholas, Arb.).
183. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
184. See, e.g., Twinsburg Bd. of Educ., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 54, 55 (2003)
(Chattman, Arb.) (mentioning subpoenaing a witness).
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some cases the witness or document subpoenaed is not available
until the day of the arbitration hearing.
1 15
Generally, the lack of discovery and difficulties with compulsory
process did not have an obvious effect on the evidence admitted-
which appeared to be comparable to the types of evidence admitted
in courts-or on the opinions and awards.18 6 In particular, the
ADA-related opinions reflect that the union and union witnesses
were generally able to provide information about the essential job
requirements and potential accommodations. As discussed in more
detail below, most opinions appear defensible under the governing
law and contract, even when the author may not agree with the
outcome.18 7 In some limited instances, however, an opinion does
leave the reader with the uneasy sense that more extensive discov-
ery might have strengthened the union's case on behalf of the
grievant. 88
One case in particular supports the notion that discovery may
sometimes be inadequate when the employer controls the relevant
information. The union argued that employees younger than the
185. There is evidence of restricted discovery procedures. In one case, an arbitrator ad-
mitted a prior statement written by the grievant but only with the admonition that it did not
set a precedent for "one party to compel the other party to hand over such written statements
during the investigative stage of the grievance disputes." Rohm & Hass Tx. Inc., 113 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 119, 122 (1999) (Woolf, Arb.). The NLRB has interpreted the NLRA to permit
employer refusal to provide unions statements obtained during the course of an investigation
of employee misconduct where the employer assured the witness that the statement would
remain confidential. N.J. Bell Tel. Co., 300 N.L.R.B. 42, 43 (1990); Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 237
N.L.R.B. 982, 984-85 (1978).
186. For instance, in one case the union very effectively marshaled the evidence and cited
nine facts, which it asserted created "a strong inference of racial discrimination" if taken
together. City of Berkeley, 94 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1198, 1200 (1990) (Bogue, Arb.). De-
spite the union's efforts, however, the arbitrator disaggregated each piece of evidence and
refuted each one by one, which is not dissimilar to how a court might address the claim. Id. at
1204-05.
187. See infra Part IV.B.1.
188. Some authors have argued that in the nonunion context employer adopted dispute
resolution systems create symbolic compliance with antidiscrimination principles but do not
necessarily effectively remedy discrimination. See Lauren B. Edelman, Howard S. Erlanger &
John Lande, Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27
LAw & Soc'v REv. 497, 508, 530 (1993). Further, they argue courts tend to defer to these
inadequate procedures. See Lauren B. Edelman et al., Wen Organizations Rule: Judicial Defer-
ence to Institutionalized Employment Structures at 63 (Sept. 2010), available at http://www.ameri
canbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/judicial_deferenceedelman.pdf. Others
argue that internal dispute resolution systems are necessary to combat second-generation
discrimination, recommending judicial oversight by "offering affirmative defenses for well-
planned processes and liability for subjective criteria." See Whitney Roth, Second Generation
Discrimination: The Need for a New Approach to Combat Subconscious Discrimination in the Workplace
(seminar paper on file with author) (citing Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrim-
ination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 465 (2001)). Examination of these
ideas in the union context may be warranted.
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grievant with similar heart conditions were permitted to work. The
decision states that the record "contains no evidence about the age,
classifications or precise medical conditions of other employees and
no showing that anyone else was in a materially similar situation."
18 9
Nevertheless, the union prevailed because the decision held that an
independent third doctor, rather than the company doctor, should
have made the decision as to whether the grievant could work. 90 In
a second case indicating that discovery may have been inadequate,
the outcome may indeed have been affected. The decision states:
"The Grievant presented a scattering of evidence that she simply
did not receive the same treatment as whites in the workplace. How-
ever, the Grievant did not present sufficient credible evidence that
whites were indeed treated more favorably than her."191 The arbitra-
tor found that, in fact, the record included evidence that white
employees had been treated the same as the grievant.192 In a third
case, the arbitrator found that while only two of 125 faculty mem-
bers were African-American, there was not "a scintilla of evidence in
the record of race discrimination."
193
Yet another case highlighted a union's failure to appreciate the
strength of the employer's case because of inadequate discovery.
94
The case was a contractual one in which no ADA claim was raised.
The mentally ill grievant was discharged for an outburst that was
the first indication of her illness and for which she was subsequently
treated. During her treatment, a psychiatrist informed the em-
ployer that she had made threats against two supervisors. The
grievant and union did not learn of this notification until the day of
the arbitration hearing, when the warning letters were admitted
into evidence. 95 Despite this setback, the grievance was sustained.
A few cases also illustrate the issue of witness unavailability, possi-
bly due to the lack of enforceable compulsory process. For instance,
an employer in one case submitted a first-line supervisor's written
189. Noranda Aluminum, Inc., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 217, 221 (2003) (Gordon,
Arb.).
190. Id. at 222.
191. Nw. Publ'g, Inc., 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 91, 95 (1994) (Bognanno, Arb.).
192. Id.
193. Lakeland Cmty. Coll., 127 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1238, 1239, 1248 (2010) (Cohen,
Arb.); see also U.S. Dep't Housing & Urban Dev., 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1261, 1267
(2005) (Coyne, Arb.) (finding "not the slightest trace of age or race discrimination").
194. In another case, the union challenged the employer's failure to provide information
about the damage caused by the grievant's negligence before the hearing, which, while not
related to the discrimination claim, illustrates the potential issue of lack of adequate discov-
ery. MSX Int'l, Inc., 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 652, 656 (2008) (Suardi, Arb.); see also
Lansing Sch. Dist., 96 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 749, 755 (1991) (Roumell, Arb.) (union in
reverse discrimination case objected to exhibit produced only at hearing).
195. AAFES Dist., 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 290, 292 (1996) (Marcus, Arb.).
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description of a coemployee's report of an alleged altercation. The
arbitrator stated that the supervisor was not available to testify at the
hearing."16 The arbitrator considered that fact in ruling for the
union. In another case, the official who made the decision to dis-
charge the grievant was not available as a witness because he had
retired.197 It is likely that in litigation he would have been subpoe-
naed to testify even if he had retired. Again, however, the grievance
in this case was sustained.
Finally, several cases demonstrate that although inadequate dis-
covery may occasionally hamper grievance arbitration, arbitrators
sometimes use creativity in addressing the resulting lack of informa-
tion. In one case, a coworker apparently reported to a parent that
the grievant, a high-school security specialist, was engaging in sex-
ual conduct with her daughter. He believed this false accusation
was part of a pattern of discrimination against and harassment of
black males, since a prior principal was terminated for engaging in
sexual conduct with a student. The union failed to produce suffi-
cient evidence to prove discrimination, and the arbitrator stated:
"The union's effort to meet its burden of proof was undoubtedly
hampered by the way in which the employer conducted its investi-
gation."1 98 In an attempt to rectify the situation, the arbitrator
ordered that the employer take measures to ensure that the em-
ployment record of the grievant would not be not adversely affected
by this controversy, to require all persons to discontinue any investi-
gation of the matter, to assure that future investigations of racial
discrimination or harassment would be investigated by persons with
competency for the task, and to keep the coworker away from the
grievant and order her to cease monitoring the grievant's activi-
ties.' 99 In another case, although it caused some delay,200 the
arbitrator was able to provide the union with time for discovery. At
196. Cal-Compack Foods, 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 865, 866 (1995) (Oestreich, Arb.).
197. Dep't. of Veterans Affairs Med. Ctr., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1571, 1580 (2007)
(Terrill, Arb.); see also Orange Co., Fla., 124 Lab. Arb. Rep. 150, 153-54, 156 (2007) (Smith,
Arb.) (union admitted statements of past fire chief, who did not testify, and lost grievance);
City of Berkeley, 94 Lab. Arb. Rep. 1198 (BNA) (1998) (Boque, Arb.) (nonbinding arbitra-
tion where one decision maker not available); John Hopkins Bayview Med. Ctr., 105 Lab.
Arb. Rep, 193, 198 (BNA) (1995) (Bowers, Arb.) (sustaining the grievance because the em-
ployer did not make an effort to locate positions for grievants and because the key witness
was not present); U.S. Dep't of Labor, 98 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1129, 1133 (1992) (Barnett,
Arb.) (arbitrator drew adverse inference against employer because harasser supervisor failed
to appear).
198. Seattle Sch. Dist., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1145, 1154 (2004) (Elinski, Arb.).
199. Id. at 1156.
200. W.G. Tomko & Sons Mech. Contractors, 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 314, 315 (2000)
(Dissen, Arb.). There was over a two-year period between filing and decision, five months of
which were between the initial hearing date and actual date. Id.
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an initial hearing, the union indicated that it intended to present
evidence of a pattern of racially discriminatory conduct in the em-
ployer's layoff practices, and that its prior request for records from
the employer had not been fully answered. The hearing was contin-
ued, and the union apparently obtained sufficient records, because
expert testimony based upon union records concerning the hiring
and length of employment was entered into evidence.20 1 Ultimately,
despite apparently procuring the information, the union lost the
grievance.
f Class actions
One protection that is available in litigation, but often lost
through agreements to arbitrate, is the ability to bring a class-action
lawsuit. 20 2 Only one decision explicitly framed the case under con-
sideration as a class-action grievance, 203 and all the cases proceeded
on behalf of only one or a handful of named grievants. Some of the
grievances, if sustained, would certainly have had a prospective ef-
fect-somewhat similar to injunctive relief or declaratory
judgment-on those employees in the bargaining unit. For in-
stance, claims to enforce seniority over disability accommodation,
to accommodate lifting restrictions or limited hours of work, to
eliminate English-only rules, to address reverse discrimination, or
to prohibit physical-abilities tests or required Sunday work certainly
impact a group of employees. The issue of making legal recourse
available to a group with limited individual damages, however, was
not raised in the cases. In part, this is explained by the limited dam-
ages awarded in these cases, discussed below.
20 4
B. Substantive Outcomes in Labor Arbitration
Overall, the decisions appear to be fair and well-reasoned. In-
deed, an employer or other person who knew nothing about the
201. Id.
202. Whether a union can agree to bring claims only as individual claims, and accord-
ingly, give up the sight to class actions without violating the National Labor Relations Act is
an open issue. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184 (2012) (holding an individually nego-
tiated class action waiver violates the National Labor Relations Act).
203. Del Monte Foods Pittsburgh Factory, 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1100, 1100-02
(2005) (Miles, Arb.) (addressing claim of only one grievant despite label of class action
grievance).
204. See infra notes 263-282 and accompanying text.
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ADA could certainly learn its requirements from reading the rele-
vant decisions and awards.20 5 The positions held by the grievants
indicate that many are not highly educated and probably do not
earn high salaries.20 6 The majority worked in manufacturing pro-
duction positions; others worked as custodians, office workers,
grocery checkers, warehouse workers, drivers of vehicles, mechan-
ics, housekeepers, security officers, and patient escorts. Only a
minority held positions requiring more education, such as teachers,
firefighters, police officers, and computer assistants. 20 7 Only a very
small minority was highly educated, such as a librarian, a math pro-
fessor, an English professor, and another Ph.D.208 Fee-shifting
statutes and the possibility of punitive damages in discrimination
cases make it possible that some of these cases might have been
taken by attorneys, even without the availability of the grievance-
arbitration process. In fact, the employee grievant in some cases
probably had counsel in a related administrative proceeding or
court case.209 But a subjective view indicates that many would not
have had representation without the union.
210
205. While there were not as many awards in Title VII cases, with a greater number of
awards, the same promises to be true.
206. Approximately 132, or 83 percent, of grievants fell in this category.
207. Approximately 18, or 11 percent, fell in this category. The data was not sorted to
determine whether there were noticeable differences in win rates or remedies based on edu-
cation level.
208. Lakeland Cmty. Coll., 127 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1238, 1239, 1248 (2010) (Cohen,
Arb.) (English professor at community college); Hartnell Cmty. Coll. Dist., 125 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 1545, 1545 (2008) (Staudohar, Arb.) (English professor at community college);
L.A. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 112 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 733, 734 (1999) (Kaufman, Arb.) (math
professor at community college); Cleveland Pub. Library, 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 781, 782
(1995) (Smith, Arb.) (professional librarians); NASA Lewis Research Ctr., 100 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 909, 909 (1993) (Minni, Arb.) (PhD and engineer).
209. See e.g., U.S. Marine Corps, 110 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 955, 957 (1998) (Cornelius,
Arb.) (explaining that the grievant hired counsel to represent him in the case, but was repre-
sented by the union in the arbitration proceeding); Westvaco Corp., 111 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 887, 888 (1998) (Nicholas, Arb.) (explaining that the court case was dismissed be-
cause the grievance arbitration procedure had not been exhausted). The author did not
specifically track which cases indicated that there was a related proceeding in which counsel
was likely utilized, though doing so might reveal interesting data. In any event, whether the
union or the employee hired counsel in these cases could not be ascertained from the
awards.
210. Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, 58 Disp. RESOL. J.
9, 10 (2003) (arguing that lower income employees are unlikely to show the $60,000 worth of
provable damages necessary to procure representation in an employment discrimination law-
suit); St. Antoine, supra note 7, at 636 ("Both personal anecdote and more systematic studies
indicate that access to the courts will not be easy for the usual lower-paid worker with an
employment claim.").
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EMPLOYEES' EDUCATION LEVEL
is Labor (unskilled or skilled) - 83% o Educated - 11%
N Highly Educated - 3% • Unknown - 3%
5 5
Some of the cases provided complex analysis with citations to
multiple legal authorities, 11 while others focused primarily on the
facts, citing only a statute or no legal authority at all.21 2 Of the 111
statutory cases, seventy-one, or approximately 64 percent, cited le-
gal authorities other than the statute.2 13 Of those, fifty-two cited
relevant case law,214 thirteen cited the EEOC guidelines or regula-
tions, 215  and twenty-six cited other arbitration decisions.
216
Seventeen decisions cited a treatise or other secondary source.
21 7
211. As to precedent, some arbitrators rely on relevant court decisions treating them as
though they are mandatory authority. Twinsburg Bd. of Educ., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 54,
59 (2003) (Chattman, Arb.) ("[T]he Arbitrator cannot reach a decision in conflict with well-
settled legal propositions.").
212. Further analysis of this data and comparison to rates at which courts cite various
forms of precedent might provide useful information regarding the ability of labor arbitra-
tion to create precedent. Cf W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Judging-Lite: How Arbitrators Use and
Create Precedent, 90 N.C. L. Rsv. 1091 (2012) (comparing arbitrator's use of precedent to
citation practices of judges).
213. Of the seventy-six statutory ADA-related cases, fifty cited legal authority, Six of these
cited only the ADA. Thus, forty-four, approximately 58 percent, cited authority other than
simply the statute. Twenty-seven of the thirty-five statutory cases responsive to the other
search, cite authority, approximately 77 percent. There were no cases responsive to this
search that cited only the statute.
214. Twenty-nine of the cases responsive to the ADA-related search cited case law, and
twenty-three of those responsive to the other searches did so.
215. Twelve of the cases responsive to the ADA-related search cited EEOC or other
agency regulations, and one of those responsive to the other searches did so.
216. Thirteen of the cases responsive to the ADA-related search cited arbitration awards,
and thirteen of those responsive to the other searches did so as well. As mentioned in one
decision, "While recognizing that arbitration awards do not have the same weight as relevant
decisions handed down by the legal system, there is an industry-wide recognition of the ac-
ceptance of prior arbitrators decisions when they relate to similar subject matter." S.F.
Unified Sch. Dist., 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 140, 143 (2000) (Riker, Arb.).
217. Ten of the cases responsive to the ADA-related search cited a treatise or other secon-
dary source, while seven of those responsive to the other searches did so.
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Forty decisions cited only the relevant statute or no legal
authority. 2
18
Examples of well-reasoned decisions, reflected in the majority of
the cases, and examples of less well-reasoned decisions are dis-
cussed in more detail below. The win-loss rates and related
information also are reported.
1. Reasoned Opinions or Defensible Conclusions
The majority of cases reach outcomes that appear defensible
under the governing law, even if one does not agree with the out-
come. Some cases engage in relatively complex analysis. For
example, decisions address whether a grievant is substantially lim-
ited in a major life activity, 219 whether an employee can perform
essential job functions with accommodation, 220 whether an accom-
modation is reasonable, 221 claims of hostile work environment
22
and of pregnancy discrimination, 223 and the relationship between a
disabled individual's right to accommodation and the seniority
rights of others.224 One case deals with the complicated provisions
regarding pre-employment and post-offer medical examinations
and questionnaires.22 5 Another notes that arbitrators fairly regularly
apply the notoriously difficult-to-teach McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting paradigm to decide discrimination cases. 22
6
218. Of the seventy-six statutory ADA-related cases, six cases cited only the statute, and
twenty-six cases cited no authority whatsoever. Of the thirty-five statutory cases responsive to
the other search, eight cases cited no authority.
219. City of Minneapolis, Pub. Works Dep't, 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 558, 562 (2008)
(Befort, Arb.); Perfection Bakeries, Inc., 110 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1043, 1047 (1997) (Stall-
worth, Arb.).
220. Rheem Mfg. Co., 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 193, 196 (1997) (Woolf, Arb.).
221. Reister and Thesmacher Co., 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 572, 576 (1996) (Weisheit,
Arb.).
222. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 837, 844 (2006) (Murphy, Arb.).
223. Garden City Union Free Sch. Dist., 2006 WL 4577848, No. 13, 3900041706 (Nov. 4,
2006) (Gregory, Arb.) (LexisNexis, BNA Labor Arbitration Decisions-Published and Unpub-
lished); Minnegasco, Inc., 103 Lab. Arb, Rep. (BNA) 43, 48 (1994) (Bognanno, Arb.).
224. Mead Products, 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1753 (2000), Contracts, Metal &Welding,
Inc., 110 Lab. Arb. Rep. 673 (1998); City of Dearborn Heights, 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 809
(1993).
225. Boise Cascade Corp., 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 223, 228 (1995) (Michelstetter II,
Arb.).
226. Commercial Cleaning Sys., Inc., 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1383, 1391 (2006) (Mc-
Curdy, Arb.) ("While McDonnell Douglas applies to civil actions under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, it is commonly used in labor-management arbitration.").
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Some decisions are very well reasoned, citing extensively to legal
authorities.227 For instance, in one case the grievant could not use a
pitchfork or pike pole, an essential job duty of his position for
which the union sought accommodation. The arbitrator reasoned
that having someone else clearjammed wood chips for him was not
the type of restructuring the ADA required. The arbitrator further
reasoned that, although the employer had previously provided a
light-duty job, it did not need to do so permanently to accommo-
date the grievant. The arbitrator emphasized that clearing wood
jams is an essential function rather than a marginal one because
trucks were unloaded every 9.6 minutes, and a failure to quickly
clear ajam could have harmful consequences. The arbitrator cited
extensively to case law in denying the grievance.
22
In another case, the arbitrator offered extensive citations to cir-
cuit court decisions in denying a grievance for sexual harassment.229
The decision reasoned that the supervisor's suggestive comments
and offers to buy things for the grievant did not rise to the level of
sexual harassment. Additionally, a manager's casual touching and
prying into her personal business did not constitute sexual harass-
ment. The conduct did not interfere with the grievant's work
performance, "nor did it exceed the limits of 'intersexual flirtation'
so as to rise to the level of 'severe or pervasive' sexual harass-
ment."230 Moreover, the company properly responded when the
grievant reported some of the conduct.
23 '
Other decisions focus on factual determinations, which are often
quite important in discrimination cases, rather than application of
227. GTE N., Inc., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1047, 1052 (1999) (Daniel, Arb.) (citing
court decisions in support of reasoning that new supervisors cannot discontinue accommo-
dating grievant); Perfection Bakeries, Inc., 110 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1043, 1049 (1997)
(Stallworth, Arb.) (citing Circuit Court of Appeals decisions and EEOC regulations in sup-
port of reasoning that grievant was not substantially limited in a major life activity). A couple
of Title VII cases from 1990, before the sample, also exemplify well-reasoned decisions that
cite legal authority. One case dealing with the BFOQ (bona fide occupational qualification)
defense to sex discrimination, extensively cites and discusses authority, including other arbi-
tration cases, and distinguishes court precedent. W. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 94 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 681, 685-87 (1990) (Kanner, Arb,). In the other, the arbitrator applied Title VII, the
PDA, and governing case law to determine that a company's refusal to pay pregnancy leave
benefits under a disability leave policy was discriminatory. Kalamazoo Label Co., 95 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 1042, 1043-44 (1990) (Ellmain, Arb.).
228. Bowater, Inc., Newsprint and Directory Div., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 382, 386-90
(2001) (Harris, Arb.).
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precedent. Nevertheless, these decisions appear well reasoned.232
For instance, in one case, two grievants suffered lifting restrictions
due to work injuries.23 3 The employer hospital had discontinued
their employment as patient escorts when the lighter-duty work
they had been performing was replaced by new technology. The
arbitrator noted that the employer acted as though it had a legal
obligation to find a suitable position for the grievants. Thus, the
arbitrator determined that although lifting was an essential func-
tion of the position, the employer had violated the ADA by not
reassigning them to a patient-aid position and providing the neces-
sary training for that position-an accommodation that would not
have caused an undue hardship to the employer.
234
In another contract-based case, the decision focused on the tim-
ing of the adverse action.235 The grievant had asked her boss
whether her gender was the reason she had not received a promo-
tion. The arbitrator was convinced that the employer, in retaliation
for the grievant's implied accusation of sex discrimination, took
one of two impermissible actions when it assigned her to an unfa-
vorable shift. The employer either made a decision immediately
after her accusation to assign her to the first shift, or the employer
considered asking her to accept first shift the day before the accusa-
tion but then abruptly abandoned that plan and peremptorily
assigned her to the first shift.
2 36
Some cases indicate that arbitrators may apply precedent that is
favorable to discriminatees. For instance, one case 237 follows a
Ninth Circuit opinion in which the court stated in dicta that even
when an employee can already perform the essential functions of
the job, reasonable accommodation may be required if it enables
232. See, e.g., City of Selah v. Gen. Teamsters Local 524, No. 16243-A-02-1377, 2002 WL
32002271, at *3 (Dec. 23, 2002) (Smith, Arb.) (reasoning that a partial hearing loss did not
necessitate a change in grievant's duties); Dep't of the Air Force, 109 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
989, 992 (1997) (Levy, Arb.) (relying on the fact that employer failed to tell new supervisors
of grievant's restrictions); Waterous Co., 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 278, 282 (1993) (Reyn-
olds, Arb.) (noting that other nondisabled employees are permitted to perform only one
function within their job classification).
233. Johns Hopkins Bayview Med. Ctr., Inc., 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 193, 197-99
(1995) (Bowers, Arb.).
234. Id.
235. Madison Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 967, 967-69 (1996)
(Kubie, Arb.). In another decision from 1990, outside the scope of the relevant data set, the
decision addressed nine facts, which the union asserted, together created "a strong inference
of racial discrimination." The arbitrator disaggregated each piece of evidence and refuted
each one by one, which is not dissimilar to how a court might address the claim. City of
Berkeley, 94 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1198, 1200, 1203-05 (1990) (Bogue, Arb.).
236. Madison Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 967-69.
237. L.A. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 112 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 733, 735, 742 (1999) (Arb.,
Kaufman).
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him to pursue a normal life.238 In this case, a math professor in the
community college system was unable to walk very far before exper-
iencing pain.239 He requested a transfer to a college closer to his
house.24  The arbitrator granted the transfer.
241
Other cases indicate that arbitrators sometimes apply the law
even less restrictively than the courts in favoring discriminatees.
242
In one case, a mechanic diagnosed with clinical depression was dis-
charged after refusing to follow a direct order for the third time
because he had not taken his medication. 243 The arbitrator rea-
soned that he met all three of the definitions of disability because
(1) his untreated depression prevented him from working, so he
was substantially limited in a major life activity; (2) he had a record
of impairment because there was a record of his depression; and
(3) he was regarded as disabled because he was regarded as having
clinical depression.244 The arbitrator also found that the employer's
failure to take the grievant's illness into account before terminating
him for insubordination constituted a failure to accommodate.
2 45
In another case, the grievant suffered from only partial hearing
loss. 246 The arbitrator nevertheless found the employer had discrim-
inated against him by relieving him of certain duties even though
his hearing loss posed no safety threat.247 Indeed, one arbitrator
recognized that when determining just cause, it is appropriate to
consider the concept of reasonable accommodation-"the funda-
mental employer obligation" under the ADA-precisely because
arbitrators had been doing so long before the ADA was enacted.
238. Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735, 740 (9th Cir. 1993).
239. L.A. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 112 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 735, 742.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin, 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 545, 554 (1997)
(Weckstein, Arb.) ("[A] n employee who suffers a knee injury and has a degenerative joint
disease of his right knee which prevents him from kneeling, stooping, bending, crawling, or
heavy lifting does have a physical impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, i.e.,
working.").
243. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 302, 306 (1995) (Concepcion,
Arb.); see also Culver City Unified Sch. Dist., 110 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 519, 520, 526-27
(1997) (Hob, Arb.) (requiring school district to accommodate teacher with sensitivity to fra-
grance by giving her input on which students may have lockers outside her classroom and by
installing security cameras and notifying students that they will be disciplined for fragrance
"assaults").
244. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 306.
245. Id.
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The arbitrator also noted that, "[i] f anything, arbitrators have been
more permissive than ADA."
248
Some awards, while reaching a defensible outcome, are not as
well reasoned or well supported by citations to authority as would
be ideal.2 49 In one case, for instance, the union challenged a
mandatory overtime policy as applied to individuals physically re-
stricted from working overtime. 250 The arbitrator found that those
with valid restrictions were being accommodated and that the pol-
icy itself did not violate the ADA. Such an outcome is certainly
within the range of reason. The arbitrator, however, was not ex-
plicit about which cases he relied on or how the actual
accommodations related to the finding that the ADA was not
violated.25
1
Even in those cases where the reasoning offends notions of jus-
tice, some outlier judges might make the same legal or factual
ruling. In one case, the arbitrator noted that the grievant's mental
illness did not appear to be a disability covered by the ADA and that
the employer did not appear to have a duty to accommodate.25 2 In
another, a pregnant woman was denied tenure. The arbitrator
found that because she had miscarried, she was not pregnant at the
time of the tenure decision, despite evidence that she had notified
college decision makers, who were aware of the pregnancy and who
mentioned it before the tenure meeting.25 3
248. Thermo King Corp., 102 Lab, Arb. Rep. (BNA) 612, 615 (1993) (Dworkin, Arb.)
("The right of handicapped people to hold jobs they can perform was a societal value long
before Congress made it a law. Arbitrators expressed it decades before [the] ADA was
enacted.").
249. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1261, 1267
(2005) (Coyne, Arb.) (implying, but never explicitly stating, that white employees were hired
for positions over black employees); Robinson Bus Serv., Inc., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 372
(2001) (Cox, Arb.) (failing to cite case law, such as Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775 (1998) and Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), in support of em-
ployer defense); Meijer, Inc., 103 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 834, 840 (1994) (Daniel, Arb.)
(providing no citation for proposition that it is doubtful that a mentally ill grievant is dis-
abled under ADA if the grievant fails to seek treatment and take medication); Spectruite
Consortium, Inc., 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1134, 1140 (1993) (Hilgert, Arb.) (failing to
address the claim of discriminatory treatment in depth).
250. Bobcat Co., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 817, 817-18 (2004) (Jacobowski, Arb.).
251. Id. at 820.
252. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1313, 1321-22 (2004) (DiFalco,
Arb.) (grievant, a custodial supervisor, suffering mental health and substance abuse
problems, terminated for threatening to kill five coworkers); cf Littleton v. Wal-Mart Stores,
231 Fed. App'x. 874, 877-78 (11th Cir. 2007) (concluding that twenty-nine-year-old man with
mental retardation was not an individual with a disability); Heisler v. Metro. Council, 339
F.3d 622, 628-30 (8th Cir. 2003) (depressive disorder is not a disability under ADA where
plaintiff supervised others at work).
253. Hartnell Cmty. CoIl. Dist., 125 Lab, Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1545, 1551-52 (2008)
(Staudohar, Arb.); see also City of Plymouth, No. 09-PA-0847, 2010 WL 5575016 (Jan. 4, 2010)
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In another case, the outcome was not affected by a misunder-
standing of the law. The arbitrator was called upon to decide
whether requiring a temporarily ill employee, who had sutures, to
be able to perform 100 percent of his job duties-entering nuclear
hot areas wearing a respirator-violated the ADA. The decision
states that "[t] he reasonable accommodation is meant for prospec-
tive employees who want to work for the Company." 25 4 This
description of the law is suspect, although the determination that
such employees would not be substantially limited and therefore
not covered under the ADA, is probably correct. This was, however,
more than a decade ago. Today's arbitrators are probably familiar
with the coverage requirements of the ADA.
Finally, some arbitrators do not even appear to apply the ADA
requirements, focusing instead on the union's failure to prove that
the Act requires an accommodation for the grievant's condition or
problem.
255
(Daly, Arb.) (grievant did not complete paperwork verifying her disability and explaining her
limitations so the ADA was not applied); Mich. Dep't Pub. Health, 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
713 (1993) (Kanner, Arb.) (holding that white male with 4.4 more points than white female
candidate in employment selection process was discriminated against when he was denied
promotion in favor of her). One case that is earlier than those cases relied on in the research
sample appears to illustrate the inadequacies of labor arbitration to address sex discrimina-
tion. A police officer was transferred because of her pregnancy. City of Aurora, 96 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 1196, 1199-1200 (1990) (Snider, Arb.). The representation, although by an at-
torney, appears inadequate, which may have been due to lack of discovery because certain
information, like the maternity leave policy, was not produced until post-hearing briefs were
filed. Id. at 1200-01. The arbitrator would not consider whether the pregnant grievant's
transfer was discriminatory unless the argument could be tied to a particular contract provi-
sion, and would not consider the maternity leave policy because it was not timely raised. Id. at
1201-03. A footnote, however, did reason that the woman was not discriminated against on
the basis of pregnancy as compared to males on disability because they were not covered by
the maternity leave policy. Id. at 1202 n.12. The footnote reasoned that the disparate treat-
ment as compared to other pregnant officers was not because of sex, but must have been for
some other reason. Id. The case seems to follow the logic of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125 (1976), which was subsequently overruled by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
254. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc,, 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 336, 342 (1995)
(Goodstein, Arb.).
255. Minnegasco, 109 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 220, 224 (1997) (Jacobowski, Arb.) (finding
that the union failed to prove that employee with alcoholism who lost job because of DWI
required an accommodation). In this case, the arbitrator could have instead reasoned that
the employee lacked the ability to perform an essential job duty, driving, even with accommo-
dation. This would have been more in keeping with the ADA.
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2. Win Rates and Remedying Discrimination
The win rate for unions appears to be low2-36 Overall, the union
prevailed in fifty-seven cases, or approximately 36 percent, and lost
103, or approximately 64 percent.257 Excluding cases where the
union grieved on behalf of a group of senior employees against a
policy benefiting a disabled employee or on behalf of the nonreli-
gious majority in favor of a policy requiring the religious minority
to work on Sundays, the sample size is reduced to 150 cases. Of
those, the union prevailed in forty-nine cases, or approximately 33
percent, and lost 101 cases, or approximately 67 percent.25 8 Win
256. Scholars have found similarly low win rates in individual arbitration and federal
court, but higher win rates in state court on nondiscrimination claims. See, e.g., Colvin, supra
note 11, at 5 (reporting 21.4 percent win rate in AAA individual mandatory employment
arbitration claims); Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 11, at 48 (reporting 36.4 percent win rate in
federal court on employment-discrimination claims and 56.6 percent win rate in state court
on non-civil rights claims). The difference in win rates between labor arbitration reported in
this research and AAA employment arbitration based on Colvin's research is statistically sig-
nificant. The p value is .0019. The difference in win rates between labor arbitration reported
in this research and state court based on Eisenberg & Hill's research is also statistically signifi-
cant. The p value is <.0001. There is no statistically significant difference in win rates between
labor arbitration reported in this research and federal court based on Eisenberg & Hill's
research. The p value is .3911. See the appendix for the full statistical analyses. Scholars have
also -found low win rates in ADA cases in federal court. See e.g., Amy L. Allbright, 2010 Employ-
ment Decisions under the ADA Titles I and V-Survey Update, 35 MENTAL & PYsniCaL DisABrLiTV L.
REP. 394 (2011) (reporting a 1.8 percent win rate in federal court cases reported in Westlaw);
Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239,
248 (2001) (reporting a success rate in ADA appellate employment discrimination cases re-
ported in Westlaw of 12 percent); see also Kevin M. Clermont & StewartJ. Schwab, Employment
Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HaRv. L. & POL'Y REv. 103, 131
(2009) (finding employment discrimination plaintiffs have lower success rates by settlement,
during pretrial adjudication, and at trial).
257. The union won thirty-nine cases responsive to the ADA-related search, and lost sixty-
two of those. It won eighteen cases responsive to the other searches, and lost forty-one of
those.
258. The difference between the unions' win rate and that of the employers, 101 of 150
cases (67 percent) is statistically significant with a p value of <.0001. See the appendix for
complete statistical analysis. The union won thirty-two cases responsive to the ADA-related
search, and lost sixty of those. It won seventeen cases responsive to the other searches, and
lost forty-one of those. Disaggregating the two types of claims, thus, shows that the union won
35 percent of the ADA-related claims and 29 percent of the other discrimination claims. With
a p value of .4894, the different win rates were not statistically significant. See appendix for
complete statistical analysis. For both categories the win rate appears higher than that found
for individual AAA employment arbitration and lower than that found in federal court. See
supra note 256. The author did not further disaggregate the cases by categories such as sexual
harassment, religious discrimination, and race discrimination, but assuming the small sample
of fifty-eight cases could lead to valuable information, further disaggregation is warranted in
future work. See Pat K. Chew, Arbitral and Judicial Proceedings: Indistinguishable Justice or Justice
Denied?, 46 WAKE FOresST L. REv. 185, 202-07 (2011) (qualitatively analyzing nineteen AAA
individual employment arbitration racial harassment cases).
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rates include a partial win on a statutory or contractual discrimina-
tion claim but do not include a claim where the union lost a
discrimination claim but prevailed on an unrelated contract
claim.
2 59
CASES WON (150 TOTAL)
a Union (33%)
a Employer (67%)
The low win rate may be attributable to opportunities during the
grievance process for employers to resolve cases in which grievants
are likely to prevail, and to the fact that a union may thereafter
knowingly bring a losing case, either to give voice to the dispute or
to avoid a lawsuit claiming breach of its duty of fair representa-
tion.260 Additionally, the win rate may be lower because summary
judgment is not traditionally used in labor arbitration to dispose of
nonmeritorious cases.2 61 Or it may be that some cases that grievants
might have won in court or in another venue are lost in arbitration.
A subjective reading suggests that more cases fall into the former
category than the latter, although there are certainly cases that
259. Further investigation of cases where grievants won on other grounds provides a sub-
ject for additional research. It is possible that a union contract which provides the grievant
other avenues of winning a claim is preferable to having to claim through protected status,
given that some scholars have argued that there is a psychic harm in being forced to claim
through protected status. See, e.g., WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY. POWER AND FREEDOM IN
LATE MODERNITY 27-29 (1995) (arguing that resolving discrimination through litigation bur-
dens victims' personal and public identities by permanently marking them as victims of
discrimination). Others have noted that unions prefer to rely on contractual claims that
"pose less of a danger of dividing workers." Estreicher & Eigen, supra note 68, at 4.
260. Cf St. Antoine, supra note 7, at 639. Indeed, it is possible that there is actually a
higher level of enforcement of potential discrimination claims with a union in the workplace
than without. See David Weil, Individual Rights and Collective Agents: The Role of Old & New
Workplace Institutions in the Regulation of Labor Markets, in EMERGING LABOR MARKET INsTITU-
TIONS FOR THE TENTY-FIRST CEwrTURv 13, 27 (2004), available at http://www.nber.org!
chapters/c9948.
261. Bales, supra note 128, at 348.
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grievants lost in arbitration but that they might have won in a differ-




The types of relief awarded in the cases in which the union pre-
vailed are limited. In twenty-one cases, the grievant was reinstated,
in seven the grievant was accommodated, in twenty-three the griev-
ant received back pay or lost wages, in four cases the award ordered
the employer to cease and desist from specific conduct or to engage
in a specific policy, and in two the parties were ordered to engage
in further bargaining.20 Other remedies included severance pay,
payment of medical costs, promotion, shift assignment, training,
creation of new positions and bestowal of "super-seniority," removal
of documents from personnel files, priority consideration for a po-
sition, transfer, medical examination, recall rights, and, in one case,
a posted apology, assurances that employees could complain of dis-
crimination, and a meeting with the union representative.2 64
In some instances, arbitrators acted more like settlement officers
than decision makers, pushing the parties to work out a solution
262. See supra notes 252-253 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Orange Cnty., 124 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 150, 159 (2007) (Smith, Arb.) (holding that employer did not have to turn
temporary position that included an exemption from required physical activity into a perma-
nent position for employee with muscular dystrophy).
263. The data was not sifted to ascertain how many cases seeking reinstatement, as op-
posed to accommodation or back pay for a suspension, resulted in reinstatement, though
doing so may provide further insight into the adequacy of the remedies in labor arbitration.
264. This summary does not include the seniority cases and the one case where a grievant
challenged a policy favorable to those who could not work on Sunday for religious reasons.
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themselves. In more than one instance, an arbitrator remanded the
case to the parties to determine whether a reasonable accommoda-
tion for a disability could be made, but retained jurisdiction over
the case.265 Arbitrators also ordered parties to negotiate layoff
rightS2 66 and the effect of an affirmative action policy.
2 67
Arbitrators also seem not infrequently to come up with creative
solutions that might not be implemented by a court. In one case, an
employee had lung cancer and elected to claim disability instead of
wearing a dust mask, but then sought to return to work when the
disability application was denied. The employer refused reinstate-
ment for the grievant's own safety. The arbitrator ordered a
medical exam and a reasonable accommodation based upon the
exam, and retained jurisdiction for ninety days to oversee imple-
mentation of the award.2 68  In another case, involving the
termination of a grievant for outbursts and threats, the arbitrator
ordered reinstatement conditioned upon the grievant continuing
her treatment and medication. The arbitrator ordered that the
grievant consent to the employer having access to the grievant's
medical records and that the employer maintain that information
in confidence.
2 69
In another case, the arbitrator found that a hotel owner had re-
taliated against the grievant for complaining of sexual harassment.
The arbitrator ruled that reinstatement was not appropriate be-
cause of the grievant's volatile relationship with the owner, and
awarded severance pay instead. Additionally, cognizant of the chil-
ling effect of retaliation, the arbitrator required the employer to
265. See Dep't of Veterans Affairs Med. Ctr., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1571, 1587 (2007)
(Terrill, Arb.) (remanding to parties to determine if reasonable accommodation was possi-
ble); Sherwin-Williams Co., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1184, 1192 (2000) (Statham, Arb.)
(reinstating employee subject to conditions, including that job placement is consistent with
medical restrictions); U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 202, 206 (1996)
(Moore, Arb.) (directing parties to discuss applicability of ADA and retaining jurisdiction to
conduct hearing if no satisfactory solution reached); Multi-Clean, Inc., 102 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 463, 469 (1993) (Miller, Arb.) (remanding to parties to determine if reasonable ac-
commodations possible); Waterous Co., 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 278, 284 (1993)
(Reynolds, Arb.) (reinstating employee and ordering parties to negotiate specific job
functions).
266. Henkel Corp., 110 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1121, 1127-28 (1998) (West, Arb.) (find-
ing that a grievant with heart disease was not substantially limited and could be laid off, but
not fired, after being transferred to a position that she could not work, though the parties
would have to negotiate her layoff rights).
267. Mich. Dep't Pub. Health, 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 713, 719-20 (1993) (Kanner,
Arb.) (determining white male was most qualified for a position that was awarded to a
woman because of affirmative action policy, and ordering parties to settle within 30 days or
submit briefs on subject of an appropriate award).
268. Champion Int'l Corp., 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1024, 1033 (1996) (Howell, Arb.).
269. AAFES Distribution, 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 290, 297 (1996) (Marcus, Arb.).
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post a formal notice containing an apology to the grievant, a state-
ment setting forth the full order in the case, and specific assurances
to employees that they may protest employment practices among
themselves or to their union without fear of discipline or other re-
taliatory conduct. The award further ordered that the union
representative would conduct a one-hour meeting with employees
on company time to review the notice and answer questions. 270
In some cases, the unions requested remedies that might have
been available in court, but were denied by the arbitrators. For ex-
ample, in one case, the employer prohibited the grievant, the
union president, from wearing scrubs to work when female employ-
ees were permitted to do so. The union sought damages. The
arbitrator found no evidence to support the $500,000 damage re-
quest for stress and hardship. The arbitrator also found no
constitutional violation had been properly alleged and, as a result,
deemed damages of $2 million for such violation inappropriate.2 71
A court allowing this claim may not have made a large award but
might well have awarded some damages. The arbitrator ordered
only that the grievant be permitted to wear scrubs.
In another case, the grievants brought a sexual harassment claim
and sought remedies that the arbitrator reasoned were not available
in labor arbitration. The decision held that the arbitrator does not
have authority, based on arbitral precedent, to order discipline of a
supervisor because the supervisor is outside the bargaining unit. An
arbitrator can order that conduct cease, but cannot even order an
apology from the supervisor. Additionally, where Title VII is not
fully incorporated into the contractual no-discrimination clause by
terms prohibiting discrimination "as provided by law[," the parties
prohibit sex discrimination using different procedural and reme-
dial mechanisms. 272 The decision reasoned that arbitrators
generally should not award damages for mental distress, and, even
if they could, would need proof of the amount of harm, such as
missed work, psychosomatic illness, or evidence of medical bills.273
Because this arbitrator mentions the difference between such an
agreement and one that adopts the full statutory scheme, the result
might be different under an express waiver post-Pyett, permitting an
award of damages for mental distress, if proven.
Another case indicates that some employers use arbitration to re-
duce the risk of punitive damages and to try to bar legitimate claims
270. Rodeway Inn, 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1003, 1015-16 (1994) (Goldberg, Arb.).
271. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 515, 530 (2002) (Neas, Arb.).
272. Union Camp Corp., 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 295, 301 (1995) (Nolan, Arb.).
273. Id. at 302.
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altogether. A woman suffered harassment at the hands of her super-
visor.274 She filed a court case, but the judge ordered the matter to
arbitration upon the employer's motion. In arbitration, the em-
ployer argued that the union had not made a timely demand for
arbitration. The arbitrator noted that "[i] t is rather interesting that
the Company ... was the party interested in forcing the dispute
back to arbitration.... Now the Company raises the claim that the
grievance is not timely.. in an attempt to avoid arbitration as well.
It is an interesting maneuver."275 The decision found that the griev-
ant was subjected to a hostile work environment and thus awarded
back pay for time missed because of the harassment and medical
expenses. It did not, however, award any punitive damages, on the
theory that no retaliation was proved.
2 76
Moreover, one case indicates that the traditional focus of labor
arbitration on reinstatement and the removal of disciplinary action
may leave discrimination unremedied.27 7 The union challenged a
layoff as retaliation for reporting sexual harassment.278 The arbitra-
tor found that a supervisor had indeed sexually harassed the
grievant for two years, but that a different manager had made the
layoff decision, which the arbitrator reasoned was thus not retalia-
tory.2 79 Having lost the dispute, the grievant received no remedy for
the harassmentY80 As the company argued, the grievant could file a
charge with the appropriate state agency or EEOC, but had not
done so. Perhaps if the case had arisen post-Pyett under an explicit
waiver, the arbitrator would have awarded some remedy for the
harassment.
Finally, in one case, the union sought damages and attorneys'
fees for a failure to accommodate a bipolar grievant. The arbitrator
found that the employer had failed to accommodate the grievant
and remanded the case to the parties to agree to a reasonable ac-
commodation and appropriate damages. The parties settled before
274. El Paso Elec. Co., 109 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1086, 1087 (1998) (Allen, Arb.).
275. Id. at 1090,
276. Id. at 1093.
277. On the other hand, in many cases reinstatement may be precisely the remedy a
grievant most desires. See, e.g., Ellen Berrey, Steve G. Hoffman & Laura Beth Nielsen, Situated
Justice: A Contextual Analysis of Fairness & Inequality in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 46
LAw & Soc'y Rav. 1, 26-27 (2012). Further research comparing the rate of reinstatement in
arbitration versus court and the types of cases in which it is used may be warranted.
278. ITT Fed. Serv. Corp., 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 289, 294 (1995) (Landau, Arb.).
279. Id. at 295-96.
280. Id. at 297.
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the additional hearing scheduled to address any remaining
issues.28'
As the represented party, the union typically pays attorneys' fees.
Thus, it is likely that the discriminatees in these cases did not bear
any costs for attorneys' fees.282 In the one case where the individual
brought the claim, no information about who paid attorneys' fees
was provided.28 3 As to the arbitrator's fee, the union and employer
often split that cost. Some cases explicitly indicate this either in the
quoted contract language or in the award. In a minority of cases,
the losing party pays the arbitrator's fee. There were two cases in
which the union, as the losing party, was to pay the fee.284 There was
one in which the employer, as the losing party, was to pay.
285
As to the concern about repeat players and the argument that,
for a variety of reasons, the arbitral process may advantage them,
only a few employers were involved in more than one arbitration.
2 86
There were six repeat employers2 87 involved in approximately 8 per-
cent of the cases. The employer won both arbitrations in two
instances.288 In both of these instances, the same union was the op-
posing party. In one, the same advocate represented the employer
in both arbitrations. The union in that case had the same advocate
in both proceedings as well. The employer lost the first arbitration
but won the second in two instances.2 89 The same union was in-
volved in one instance and was represented by the same advocate.
The employer won the first arbitration but lost the second in two
instances.29 0 In one instance, the employer was represented by the
281. Dep't of Veterans Affairs Med. Ctr., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1571 (2007) (Terrill,
Arb.).
282. Union dues, of course, pay the fees.
283. Vermont Pub. Safety Dep't, 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 370 (1993) (Toepfer, Arb.).
284. Cincinnati State Tech., 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 153, 154 (2000) (Heekin, Arb.);
GTE N., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 665, 674 (1999) (Brodsky, Arb.).
285. Albertson's, Inc., 115 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 886, 894 (2000) (Gangle, Arb.) (holding
that grievant lost sexual harassment claim but prevailed on other grounds).
286. 1 have excluded a case involving the same grievant that went to the same arbitrator
two times, after the employer terminated the grievant a second time.
287. 1 included the Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center as the same employer,
even though it was a different center in two different states, under the assumption (possibly
erroneous) that the Department of Veterans Affairs is a nationwide employer.
288. Rheem Mfg. Co., 117 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 473, 477 (2002) (Bankston, Arb.); Min-
negasco, 109 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 220, 224 (1997) UJacobowski, Arb.); Rheem Mfg. Co., 108
Lab. Arb. Rep. 193, 196 (BNA) (1997) (Woolf, Arb.); Minnegasco, Inc., 103 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 43, 48 (1994) (Bognanno, Arb.).
289. GTE N., Inc., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1047, 1052 (1999) (Daniel, Arb.); GTE N.,
113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 665, 674 (1999) (Brodsky, Arb.); Champion Int'l Corp., 109 Lab.
Arb. Rep. 753, 761 (1997) (Giblin, Arb.); Champion Int'l Corp., 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
1024, 1033 (1996) (Howell, Arb.).
290. Dep't of Veterans Affairs Med. Ctr., 123 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1571, 1587 (2007)
(Terrill, Arb.); Veterans Affairs Med. Ctr., 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1217, 1222 (2000)
SPRING 2013]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
same attorney both times. Different unions were involved in the two
arbitrations. 291 In none of the six instances involving repeat employ-
ers was the second arbitration in front of the same arbitrator. The
repeat player effect thus likely does not explain why an employer
wins. Generally, concerns as to a repeat player effect are probably
lessened in the union context where both the union and the em-
ployer tend to be repeat players.
292
C. Union Representation in Labor Arbitration
As previously discussed, the grievance-arbitration process appears
suitable for handling the majority of the cases, although some con-
cern about discovery remains.2gs Additionally, the cases indicate
that in most instances, arbitrators have the ability to apply the law to
the facts, not only to interpret CBA's. 294 This section addresses addi-
tional concerns about the suitability of the labor-arbitration process
to address discrimination claims, particularly the possibility that
union conflicts will result in inadequate representation for dis-
criminatees. It first discusses instances in which unions have
negotiated greater or lesser protections for discriminatees. It then
turns to whether union representatives are able to understand the
law well enough to represent discriminatees, and, finally, to union
representation of discriminatees more generally.
1. Union-Negotiated Protections for Discriminatees
In many instances, the union had negotiated a no-discrimination
clause that formed one basis of the grievance.2 95 Negotiation of
(O'Grady, Arb.); Henkel Corp., 110 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1121, 1127-28 (1998) (West,
Arb.); Henkel Corp., 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 494, 501 (1995) (Hooper, Arb.).
291. In one instance, a Texas local and a North Carolina local affiliated with the same
international union were involved, and were treated as different parties because they likely
function as separate entities.
292. See Cole, supra note 7, at 863; Colvin, supra note 11, at 11.
293. See supra notes 189-193 and accompanying text.
294. See supra Part W.B.1.
295. See e.g., Commercial Cleaning Sys., Inc., 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1383, 1384, 1391
(2006) (McCurdy, Arb.); Parkersburg Bedding, 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1788, 1789 (2003)
(Zobrak, Arb.); ITT Fed. Serv. Corp., 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 289, 293 (1995) (Landau,
Arb.); Merrimack Cnty. Dept. of Corr., 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1096, 1097 (1994) (Mc-
Causland, Arb.); Altoona Hosp., 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 650, 651 (1993) (Jones, Arb.).
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such clauses indicates that unions will negotiate on behalf of minor-
ities. 296 In some instances, unions negotiated even greater
protections than those that would be available under the law, par-
ticularly when dealing with accommodating disabled individuals.
In one case, a woman who could not work overtime because of
stress that resulted in high blood pressure, abdominal pain, back
pain, dizziness, bile disorder, and insomnia was placed on involun-
tary leave. The Ohio Civil Rights Commission stated in a no-
probable cause finding that her "various medical conditions" did
not constitute a qualified disability under the ADA. The union,
nevertheless, grieved her claim under the contract, and the griev-
ance was sustained such that she was made whole for the loss of pay
during her involuntary leave.
297
In another case, an employee was injured on the job and accom-
modated for several years. His position was later consolidated with
another position that had functions he could not perform. The
union argued that "[i ] t is hardly just to deprive an individual of his
livelihood because he was injured in the course of performing his
job duties."298 The arbitrator reasoned that the CBA required more
than the ADA, and ordered that the employer provide any possible
accommodation, not just any reasonable one. The remedy was to
offer the grievant the training and opportunity to certify for a fork-
truck operator's position, which he could perform within his
limitations. 299
In a minority of cases, however, a union had negotiated provi-
sions on behalf of the majority that worked to the detriment of the
minority. One example of this phenomenon consistently arises
when unions negotiate for the seniority rights of nondisabled indi-
viduals over the rights of disabled individuals to have a position,300
296. A more cynical view would be that they negotiate such clauses only to comply with
the law and avoid suits against the union.
297. City of Akron, 111 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 705, 712 (1998) (Franckiewicz, Arb.).
298. Techneglass, Inc., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 722, 725 (2004) (Dean, Arb.). Further
exploration of whether grievants who won the dispute in disability cases were injured on the
job or had congenital disabilities would be an interesting subject for further research.
299. See also Waterous Co., 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 278, 284 (1993) (Reynolds, Arb.)
(contract requiring no discrimination because of physical impairment required reinstate-
ment of a grievant with a back injury where nonimpaired employees were permitted to
perform only some functions of the job classification).
300. See e.g., Contracts, Metals & Welding, Inc., 110 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 673, 683
(1998) (Klein, Arb.) (employer violated CBA by bumping more senior employee on first shift
to accommodate junior disabled employee).
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even in instances where the disabled individual would be termi-
nated. 30 In one case, for instance, the union initially agreed with
the employer that the employer could let a disabled employee
bump another employee who was not the least senior, and then let
that employee bump the least senior employee.30 2 When the
bumped employee complained, however, the union filed a griev-
ance on her behalf, citing its responsibility pursuant to the duty of
fair representation. The union argued that a disabled employee
must go to the layoff pool rather than bump a more senior' em-
ployee.30 3 This case is the prototypical example of an instance in
which a union supports a nondisabled individual over a disabled
individual, even where both retained their jobs and the least senior
employee was laid off instead. Interestingly, however, the arbitrator
upheld the grievance, relying on several circuit court cases.304 Since
that time, the Supreme Court's decision in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Bar-
net'305 indicates that the arbitrator's decision is certainly defensible
as a matter of ADA interpretation.
30 6
Other cases indicate that seniority provisions are not the only
ones that unions negotiate that sometimes work to the detriment of
minority employees. Others include provisions restricting work to
unit members30 7 and those regulating work shifts. 308
2. Union Understanding of Law
The fact that unions pursued approximately 50 percent of these
cases without an attorney indicates that union agents do under-
stand legal claims well enough to pursue them through the
grievance and arbitration processes unassisted. In approximately
seventeen of the thirty-two cases involving a statutory claim that a
grievant won, the grievant was represented by an agent rather than
301. Mason & Hanger Corp., 111 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 60, 64 (1998) (Caraway, Arb.); cf
Estreicher & Eigen, supra note 68, at 4 (asserting "[e]ven when unions actively support non-
discriminatory policies, they have difficulty mediating claims of groups of workers where
those claims cannot be easily resolved by a rule favoring length of service").
302. Mead Prod., 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1753, 1755 (2000) (Nathan, Arb.).
303. Id. at 1755.
304. Id. at 1759-60.
305. 535 U.S. 391 (2002). Arguably, union conflict with disabled minorities contributed
to the Court's ruling because unions filed briefs in support of the seniority system.
306. Id. at 393 ("As we interpret the statute, to show that a requested accommodation
conflicts with the rules of a seniority system is ordinarily to show that the accommodation is
not 'reasonable.'").
307. City of Kentwood, 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 49, 52 (1995) (Lipson, Arb.).
308. Cleveland Pub. Library, 105 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 781, 783 (1995) (Smith, Arb.)
(enforcing requirement that member of religious minority group work on Sunday).
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an attorney.309 One arbitrator explicitly noted that the union agent
had the ability, even without an attorney, to understand the legal
rules governing discrimination claims. The arbitrator stated that
the union's presentation and brief displayed "an excellent grasp" of
the legal principles governing an ADA dispute .3 0 Although the
union lost, this decision was extremely well cited and reasoned.311
Of the thirty-two statutory cases the union won, in approximately
fifteen the union was represented by an attorney. While that num-
ber appears to be similar to the number not involving an attorney,
when a union receives advice from an attorney during the grievance
process and is represented by an attorney at arbitration, its ability to
understand and pursue statutory claims on its own should logically
increase. Part of legal training is learning to bring statutory claims
and to represent parties in litigation-like proceedings.
In a minority of instances, however, union representatives did
not appear to be sophisticated enough to understand the statutory
claims. An employee in one case listed a violation of the ADA as the
basis for her grievance, but the parties did not discuss reasonable
accommodation in detail during the grievance process.3 12 After set-
ting forth the basic requirements of the ADA-that an employer
make reasonable accommodations for an employee known to have
a qualified disability-the arbitrator directed the parties to discuss
the applicability of the ADA and any appropriate accommodation.
The arbitrator retained jurisdiction to conduct a hearing if no satis-
factory resolution was reached. The union's attorney actually
argued that the union representative during the grievance process
was inexperienced, and it appears that without the attorney, the
grievant would not even have been aware of her rights under the
ADA.31
3
309. All instances when it was not indicated that the representative was an attorney were
included, although in some minimal instances the representative may have been an attorney
and the decision failed to so note. Further analysis comparing the win rate in those cases
where a union was represented by an attorney to the win rate in those cases where a union
was not represented by an attorney might reveal additional pertinent information.
310. Bowater, Inc., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 382, 386 (2001) (Harris, Arb.); see also
Garden City Union Free Sch. Dist., 2006 WL 4577848, No. 13, 3900041706 (Nov. 4, 2006)
(Gregory, Arb.) (LexisNexis, BNA Labor Arbitration Decisions-Published and Unpublished)
(noting that the parties were very well represented where union was represented by labor
relations specialist); Thermo King Corp., 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 612, 616 (1993) (noting
that the union, represented by a staff representative, made an impressive presentation and
submitted a brief).
311. See Bowater, Inc., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 386.
312. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 107 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 202, 205 (1996) (Moore,
Arb.).
313. Id. at 204, 206.
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3. Union Representation of Discriminatees
Finally, the cases indicate that unions are representing dis-
criminatees in grievance arbitrations and are doing well enough to
prevail in a significant minority of them. Many examples illustrate
that unions assert the rights of minority employees. For instance, in
one case, the union successfully argued, in part based upon EEOC
findings, that men had been accommodated with light-duty place-
ments whereas the female grievant had not.314 In another case, the
union asserted that a deaf teacher should be entitled to teach phon-
ics with accommodation, particularly where she was more senior
than teachers assigned to do so.315 In a third case, the union as-
serted that a test for physical strength had a disparate impact on
women, therefore unjustly disqualifying the female grievant from a
position.
316
In another case, the shop steward and union had supported the
female janitor's sexual harassment claim, resulting in the transfer of
the alleged harasser. The union then grieved the failure to accom-
modate the grievant and her retaliatory termination. The shop
steward had worked as her partner, doing the work she could not
perform as a result of her lifting restrictions.317 Indeed, in some
cases, unions sought numerous and costly accommodations. In one
case, the union sought measures that included replacement of lock-
ers at a cost of $13,500 and stationing a security officer outside the
classroom door of a grievant teacher allergic to perfume.318
Some cases demonstrate that some unions will support minority
employees even in the face of complaints from the majority. In one
case, for example, the union argued that a disabled grievant could
work while sitting and coworkers could perform the necessary
climbing and digging without harming either the grievant or the
coworkers. Previously, others complained when the grievant worked
in air conditioning, but the union did not file any grievances and
314. Sherwin-Williams Co., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1184, 1188-89 (2000) (Statham,
Arb.).
315. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 140, 142 (2000) (Riker, Arb.).
316. Detroit Edison Co., 96 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1033, 1037-38 (1991) (Lipson, Martin,
Dopke, Arbs.).
317. Commercial Cleaning Sys., Inc., 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1383, 1391 (2006) (Mc-
Curdy, Arb.); see also Anchorage Sch. Dist., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1313, 1318 (2004)
(DiFalco, Arb.) (union representative whom grievant had threatened to kill testified that she
was not afraid of grievant, having dealt with him on many occasions where "nothing unto-
ward happened").
318. Culver City Unified Sch. Dist., 110 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 519, 526 (1997) (Hoh,
Arb.).
[VOL. 46:3
Arbitration of Employment-Discrimination Claims
promised not to grieve complaints over the sitting arrangement ei-
ther. The employer refused to agree to the sitting accommodation,
and the union grieved on the disabled grievant's behalf. Neverthe-
less, the arbitrator believed it would violate coworkers' rights if they
did more than their fair share of aerial work, and denied the
grievance.3 "9
Finally, some cases demonstrate that unions will aggressively
push interpretation of the contract and law on behalf of minority
employees. In other contexts, unions push cases to arbitration, even
though they know they are likely to lose, to permit employees to tell
their side of the story and to make a strong point to the employer
that certain conduct is unacceptable in the eyes of the employees.3 20
Perhaps unions are also pushing the boundaries of the law to let
employers know that certain actions resulting in apparent discrimi-
nation are not acceptable. For example, some unions appear to
believe women should be given training to foster advancement
when all higher paid positions are filled by men, 3 2 and some ap-
pear to believe that coworkers should not stereotype all employees
of one race and gender based on the conduct of one coworker of
that race and gender.32 2 These cases suggest that commentators
who argue that unions can be a force against discrimination are
correct.3
23
There are, however, cases in which unions have declined to pur-
sue certain claims or remedies for a discriminatee because of
conflict with the majority. For instance, in one case, the union held
a meeting to see if "super seniority" could be provided to an em-
ployee disabled as a result of a work injury. Such status would
permit him to bid on jobs that met his physical restrictions. In a
319. GTE N. Inc., 113 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 665, 670, 674 (1999) (Brodsky, Arb.).
320. Cf St. Antoine, supra note 3, at 795 n.58.
321. Empire Dist. Elec. Co., 118 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 919, 923 (2003) (Berger, Arb.)
(woman grievant argued that with instruction and training, she could have performed the
job that was given to a less senior male worker).
322. See Seattle Sch. Dist., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. 1145, 1154 (BNA) (2004) (Elinski, Arb.)
(unidentified pattern of harassment and negative comments about black males, after princi-
pal was discharged for having inappropriate sexual relationship with a student, is not enough
to show pattern of discrimination).
323. See Twinsburg Bd. of Educ., 119 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 54 (2003) (Chattman, Arb.)
(arguing for accommodation despite Ohio Civil Rights Commission's prior decision finding
no disability); Vicksburg Cmty. Sch., 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 771, 776 (1993) (Daniel,
Arb.) (holding that the controlling Title VII law permits an employer to accommodate an
unpaid religious leave, but that the employee's contract requires paid leave).
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secret ballot, voting members of the unit rejected the proposal. Ul-
timately, the employer simply modified the employee's current
position .324
There are also examples of unions pursuing claims on behalf of
the majority that disadvantage minority members. For example, in a
1991 case not included within the sample, the union filed griev-
ances on behalf of two white firefighters who had been denied
promotions.325 This certainly supports the proposition that unions
might support majority members over minority members. In reli-
ance on then-governing Supreme Court precedent and an Eighth
Circuit decision upholding the City of Omaha's affirmative action
plan, the arbitrator denied the grievance by these white firefighters.
A promotion list based upon certain test scores was typically used.
In this instance, four black firefighters were promoted ahead of two
white firefighters who were ranked significantly higher on the pro-
motion list.326
One arbitrator noted that cases in which a grievant challenges
the promotion of another union member place the union in a no-
win situation. The arbitrator in that case found that the member
who used a spell-checker during a firefighter test was not disabled
under the terms of the ADA, but the grievant still lost the case on
the basis of the CBA'S contractual language, which permitted the
other member to use this feature.
3 27
And there are several instances in which union representation
appears to be less than adequate because of failure to understand-
ing the law, internal conflict, or for other reasons not precisely
discernible from the decisions.328 For instance, one decision indi-
cates that the union argued that a provision requiring compliance
324. Fox River Paper Co., 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 871, 874 (1995) (Suntrup, Arb.); cf.
Anchor Hocking Operating Co., 125 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 312, 316 (2008) (union pursued
mentally ill grievant's claim although he testified that a coworker who was also a union repre-
sentative was the person who most harassed him); Interstate Brands Corp., 113 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 161, 166 (1999) (Howell, Arb.) (union steward's testimony that grievant fright-
ened him supported just cause for termination).
325. City of Omaha, 97 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 180, 183 (1991) (Mikrut, Jr., Arb.). In two
other cases, not included in the sample because they were not framed as discrimination
cases, unions represented employees complaining of loss of a position to a woman who was
given a position after being sexually harassed.
326. Id.
327. Delta Twp., 111 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 936, 939-40 (1998) (Sugerman, Arb.).
328. In a couple of other case, the union's failure to focus on the discrimination claims
might be because of the availability of the EEOC to address the claims. See, e.g., Cramer, Inc.,
110 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 37, 41-42 (1998) (O'Grady, Arb.) (union did not argue violation
of the ADA where the EEOC had found that the claims were without merit). In one case, the
Illinois Department of Human Rights advised the grievant that she did not have to answer
questions at arbitration, but after consulting with her attorney and the union steward, she
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with handicap laws was violated. The decision stated that it was un-
clear whether the grievant's learning disabilities were "handicaps"
within the meaning of the law because the union did not cite to
applicable statutes, regulations, or court decisions. Also, the deci-
sion states that the union did not proffer any accommodations that
would be reasonable, and that having someone do the necessary
reading and math for the grievant would not be a reasonable
accommodation.3
29
In another case, the arbitrator found that the grievant was not
substantially limited. But the arbitrator also noted that the record
was insufficient to determine that the accommodations provided-
involuntary twenty-four-month leave and notice of other positions
with the company-were not reasonable.330 The arbitrator pointed
out that the union had acquiesced in the leave33' that ultimately
resulted in termination, and that the union had not raised the ADA
claim during the grievance procedure.33
2
Another case indicates that perhaps the union could or should
have presented more evidence. The decision states that "[t]he
Grievant presented a smattering of evidence that she simply did not
receive the same treatment as whites in the workplace. However,
the Grievant did not present sufficient credible evidence that whites
were indeed treated more favorably than her." The arbitrator found
that the record included evidence that white employees had been
treated the same as the grievant.
333
elected to fully participate. See Robinson Bus Serv., Inc., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 372, 373
(2001) (Cox, Arb.).
329. Turbine Engine Components Techs. Corp., 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 274, 279
(2004) (Fullmer, Arb.).
330. Safeway Corp., No. 08-50449, 2008 WL 8203229, at *8 (Apr. 30, 2008) (Wages, Arb.).
331. Id. at *10.
332. Id. at *9.
333. Nw. Publ'n Inc., 104 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 91, 95 (1994) (Bognanno, Arb.); see also
City of Norman, 122 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 929, 930 (2006) (Goodstein, Arb.) (union repre-
sentative completely unprepared for predisciplinary hearing and employee was subsequently
discharged); U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1261, 1268 (2005)
(Coyne, Arb.) ("CC]laims of this nature must be supported by reliable data."); Veterans Af-
fairs Med. Ctr., 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1217, 1220 (2000) (O'Grady, Arb.) (union did not
put on sufficient evidence to show a handicapping alcohol condition); Keystone Steel & Wire
Co., 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1466, 1472 (2000) (Goldstein, Arb.) (union did not provide
sufficient evidence of employees in similar situations receiving different treatment); Wacken-
hut Servs., Inc., 112 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 798, 800 (1999) (Crider, Arb.) ("The race
discrimination claim, a frivolous afterthought raised for the first time in arbitration, is dis-
missed."); Minnegasco, Inc., 103 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 43, 48 (1994) (Bognanno, Arb.)
(union must present competent evidence of similarities to show disparate treatment); Spec-
trulite Consortium, Inc., 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1134, 1138, 1140 (1993) (Hilgert, Arb.)
(only witness for union was grievant, and there was insufficient evidence of discrimination).
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IV. PRELIMINARY SUGGESTIONS FOR LABOR ARBITRATION OF
EMPLOYMENT-DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Does labor arbitration provide access to justice for those with em-
ployment-discrimination claims? A review of these opinions and
awards suggests that in many instances, it does. It often provides a
procedure with due-process protections, a decision maker who in-
terprets the law and the contract as applied to the facts, and a
union that advocates for the grievant's rights. The data also indicate
that the average length of time to resolve a dispute is approximately
503 days. While this may be longer than is ideal, it is shorter than
the time reported to receive a trial in federal or state court.3 4 In-
deed, labor arbitration is historically considered to be less
expensive, less time consuming, and-perhaps equally signifi-
cantly-less emotionally draining for the parties.
335
Moreover, labor arbitration of minimum employee rights argua-
bly strengthens enforcement and results in a greater number of
claims.336 Without a union, employees might not bring these
claims. 337 If a claim such as harassment or a need for accommoda-
tion arises during the employment relationship, employees may
fear negative ramifications of bringing the claim. If a claim such as
religious, racial, gender, or disability discrimination arises because
of termination, employees may not have the knowledge or re-
sources to pursue the claim. The broad range of job positions
involved in the cases reviewed lends some support to this theory,
which has been explored in the context of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act (OSHA) and other individual-rights statutes. 3 8
Labor arbitration may also make it more likely that a successful
relationship between the parties will continue. Reinstatement is a
common, though not universal, remedy in labor arbitration. Award-
ing reinstatement indicates that the presence of the union as a
mediating force between the employer and the grievant makes sal-
vaging the relationship more likely. Because the parties work
together on a regular basis, the potential to resolve ongoing issues
also increases. Coworker support may be important to the success-
ful resolution of discrimination claims.
334. Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 11, at 51 (reporting average of 709 days to trial in
federal court for employment-discrimination claims and 723 days to reach trial in state court
for non-civil rights employment claims).
335, See Cole, supra note 7, at 863.
336. See ESMUND, supra note 9, at 166 ("The presence of an independent collective em-
ployee voice enhances the enforcement of regulatory standards.") (footnote omitted); Weil,
supra note 260, at 27.
337. See Bales, supra note 101, at 753 (discussing advantage to low-income employees).
338. Weil, supra note 260, at 27.
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Labor arbitration is also tailored to address workplace problems.
The union brings expertise to the table, as does the arbitrator. They
should ideally understand the particular workplace as well as the
broader context of work in the country.
If labor arbitration provides access to justice for employees with
employment-discrimination claims, what benefits does it have for
employers? For the employer, less expense and saved time are clear
positives of labor arbitration. Like the employee, the employer
sometimes benefits from having ongoing relationships rather than
having to serially retrain employees. The employer may also benefit
from the expertise of the union and the arbitrator, potentially re-
sulting in solutions that benefit all involved. The awards directing
the parties to further bargain and implementing creative solutions
illustrate this possibility. 339 Finally, while increased enforcement
may appear to be a drawback for employers, the draw of less indus-
trial strife, 340 which results in monetary loss and employee turnover,
operates as another reason labor arbitration of employment-dis-
crimination claims is just for employers as well as employees.
But what about mandatory labor arbitration of employment-dis-
crimination claims? Does it provide access to justice? Absolute
mandatory labor arbitration of employment-discrimination claims
is theoretically possible. But a system where an employee entirely
loses the ability to pursue the claim if the union elects not to pursue
it is unlikely to develop as a practical matter. Most would agree that
the employee would have no access to justice when the union elects
not to pursue the claim.3 41
What might be termed modified mandatory labor arbitration of
employment-discrimination claims may, however, provide access to
justice. In this system, the grievant would be permitted to go to
court when the union opts not to pursue the claim. 342 This is the
system currently developing under Pyett and being used in that
small number of cases in which unions agree to arbitrate rather
than litigate employees' statutory claims.
343
339. See supra notes 265-270 and accompanying text.
340. Cf Malin, supra note 122, at 372 (stating that grievance arbitration, unlike arbitra-
tion of statutory claims, "is not so much a substitute for litigation as it is a substitute for strikes
and other job actions").
341. See e.g., Safrit v. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F.3d 306 (4th Cir. 2001) (granting employer
summary judgment where employee failed to arbitrate because union advised employee to
litigate instead of grieving).
342. Bennett, supra note 106, at 29; cf Mathison & Seiler, supra note 106, at 194.
343. See, e.g., Kravar v. Triangle Servs. Inc., 186 L.R.R.M. 2565 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding
that a CBA's arbitration provision would not be enforced where the union had refused to
arbitrate a disability claim);Johnson v. Tishman Speyer Props., L.P., No. 09 Civ.1959(WHP),
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If the data examined by this Article were representative, it, along
with other sources, would tentatively suggest that modified
mandatory labor arbitration of employment-discrimination claims
can provide access to justice, particularly if targeted legislative re-
forms are enacted. The data support retaining the status quo where
Gardner-Denver governs the majority of instances of labor arbitration
of employment-discrimination claims. They also support permitting
mandatory labor arbitration in the minority of the cases for which it
is bargained by clear and unmistakable waiver, governed by such
reforms.
The system that is currently in place in most instances pursuant
to Gardner-Denver, where the union has not waived the right to pro-
ceed to court, provides access to justice in many cases. Under
Gardner-Denver, employees have the ability to pursue arbitration of
contractual claims of discrimination and to file suit on statutory
claims.3 " For the reasons discussed above, in many instances, arbi-
tration grants the employee access to justice. Where it does not-
perhaps because of short statutes of limitations or inadequate reme-
dies-the employee can still proceed instead to court or go to court
after having lost in arbitration. While this seems ideal for employ-
ees, in many cases, the court may simply use the arbitration award
to rule against the employee. While Gardner-Denver requires de novo
review, it permits the court to give the arbitration decision appro-
priate weight, leaving wide discretion to the court.3 4 Thus, one
downside of this system is the uneven weight accorded to an arbitra-
tion award. Another is that the employee and employer may
expend resources in arbitration and in court only to have the court
largely reaffirm the arbitration award. Indeed, for the employer,
the additional injustice is that it appears to grant the employee two
bites at the apple-though, realistically, given that the contract
claim is arbitrated, and the statutory claim is litigated, there are not
two bites at the same apple. Enacting the AFA will insure that the
Gardner-Denver approach, with the aforementioned advantages and
disadvantages, will be utilized in all instances because it will pro-
hibit union agreements that mandate arbitration rather than
litigation of statutory employment-discrimination claims.
In the individual employment context, some have proposed a sys-
tem where the employee must choose between arbitration and
2009 WL 3364038 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009) (dismissing discrimination claim and compelling
arbitration where employee "concedes that he declined to pursue his grievance").
344. See 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
345. Id. at 60.
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litigation but can make this selection after the dispute arises. If im-
plemented in the unionized sector, individual post-dispute election
certainly will resolve any complaints that employees are forced to
use a procedurally or substantively flawed system or to rely on a
representative with a conflict of interest. It will also permit the indi-
vidual to use labor arbitration rather than litigation when it would
provide them access to justice. While in other contexts, employers
might be unwilling to agree to only post-dispute arbitration, in the
labor-arbitration context, employers may find post-dispute election
more appealing than the current system under Gardner-Denver. The
election would eliminate cost, time, and emotion spent on both ar-
bitrating and litigating employment-discrimination claims.
However, the Gardner-Denver approach and modified mandatory
arbitration governed by targeted legislative reform are probably
preferable for reasons that are somewhat difficult to articulate but
are at the core of the dispute over which system is the most just.
The modified mandatory-arbitration framework differs from the
proposed individually controlled post-dispute election only in that
it leaves the election in the union's, rather than the individual's,
hands. The strength of collective control of workplace issues sup-
ports such an approach.3 46 If all discriminatees, or even just half of
them, elect out of the union process, the incentive for the employer
to deal with the union on workplace-discrimination issues is dimin-
ished.3 47 Thus, providing the individual, rather than the union, with
the ability to elect whether to pursue a particular dispute in arbitra-
tion undermines the ability of the union to advance the interests of
minorities over the long term. To the extent that over the long
term and in the greater number of cases, collective rather than indi-
vidual action is likely to solve problems of discrimination in the
workplace, this suggests unions should control these issues, as they
do other workplace issues.
Another question is whether self-governance will better address
issues of discrimination than outside regulation. A system that per-
mits variance across employers and creativity to solve problems in
light of the particular employer may better resolve discrimination
claims. If so, then giving the union the opportunity to pursue
346. Cf Feller, supra note 9, at 745 ("[M]any claims . . . carry implications for the
group."). At some point, a grievance arbitration process must be controlled by the union
rather than the individual grievant. Id.
347, Cf Cox, supra note 9, 24 (allowing individual claims "discourages" cooperation be-
tween the employer and the union "which is normally the mark of sound industrial
relations").
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claims rather than relying on a unitary individual-rights system may
be best.3
48
The system under Gardner-Denver, to some extent, provides collec-
tive strength and self-governance because discrimination claims can
be brought by the union under the contract and by the individual
in court. It thus permits the union to have force on discrimination
issues and also allows individuals to sometimes pursue their claims
in their own way. It is because of the power of collective action and
self-governance that the Gardener-Denver and Pyett systems are per-
haps preferable to a system permitting individual election. The
current system embraces both Gardner-Denver and Pyett.
The modified mandatory-arbitration system developing under Py-
ett does, however, remove all individual ability to elect between
arbitration and litigation, and thus vests in a union all control of
employment-discrimination cases, even when the union may have
conflicts of interest or simply be an inadequate representative. It
also requires use of an arbitration system, which may have inade-
quately short statutes of limitation or inadequate remedies, as well
as other potential problems. To address these concerns, this Article
provides a starting point for considering legislative reforms to en-
sure that when the modified mandatory system is used, the system
provides equal access to justice.
This research suggests that potential areas for improvement in
procedural protections are access to greater discovery and, to a
lesser degree, compulsory process. To a limited extent, short stat-
utes of limitations may pose problems. Legislation that sanctions
arbitrators who make adverse inferences when witnesses fail to ap-
pear, guarantees the applicability of statutory statutes of limitations
when arbitrating statutory employment-discrimination claims, and
authorizes class actions in labor arbitration or exempts class actions
from mandatory labor arbitration could be considered. As to discov-
ery, legislating the availability of a certain amount of discovery in
labor arbitration of employment-discrimination claims probably
would unduly increase the cost of the procedure in all cases, even
when increased discovery is not needed. Further research might fo-
cus on whether discovery could be required in certain cases, such as
those involving claims of systemic discrimination rather than claims
for accommodation or for claims seeking a certain amount of dam-
ages. It might also focus on whether exempting certain claims from
348. Cf Stephen J. Ware, Consumer and Employment Arbitration Law in Comparative Perspec-
tive: The Importance of the Civil Jury, 56 U. MtIAm L. REv. 865, 866-67 (202) (summarizing
reasons against uniformity that support the United States' outlying approach of mandatory
arbitration).
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mandatory labor arbitration would be most effective in ensuring ad-
equate discovery.
This research further suggests that the primary potential area of
improvement as to substantive protections is insuring relief in labor
arbitration of employment discrimination cases.349 Legislation
commanding that labor arbitrators consider the full range of reme-
dies available under the applicable statute when deciding
employment-discrimination claims might easily increase the availa-
bility of remedies in labor arbitration of employment-
discrimination claims.
Another question for further research would be to consider
whether a claim for breach of duty of fair representation, as cur-
rently embodied, provides adequate protection against a union
failing to put on a strong case350 or whether some type of further
recourse, perhaps similar to an action for ineffective assistance of
counsel in the criminal context, might be best.
35
1
Because the research is based on a limited universe of awards, it
remains possible that some labor arbitrations are conducted more
like kangaroo courts than like meaningful forums for just dispute
resolution. Such a possibility might justify additional areas of regu-
lation of the labor arbitration process in Pyett cases. Of course,
increasing regulation of labor arbitration, whether by legislation or
court decision, increases the cost of the process and reduces the
possibility of self-governance, thereby potentially decreasing its
value to employees. With this in mind, working out low-cost means
of addressing these potential areas of improvement would be wor-
thy of future scholarly endeavor.
Moreover, in any of the three systems-Gardner-Denver, Pyett, or
individual election-a large number of employment-discrimination
claims may be effectively decided in labor arbitration. Under Gard-
ner-Denver, the employee may elect only to arbitrate or the
subsequent court proceeding may rely heavily on an arbitration
349. While other data may suggest difficulty with the appellate standard of review, this
data did not indicate that arbitrators were often, if ever, making clearly erroneous legal state-
ments or conclusions.
350. See Cole, supra note 7, at 888.
351. The standard should not permit every losing grievant to sue the union. Such a stan-
dard would unduly increase litigation and would not be representative of the research
indicating that in the large majority of cases, even where the grievant lost, the union ade-
quately presented the case. To the extent that the research suggests that there are conflicts
between discriminatees' interests and other employees' interests, substantive changes to dis-
crimination laws might be necessary. For instance, to the extent readers are troubled when
unions pursue the rights of more senior employees at the expense of the disabled, clarifica-
tion of the ADA to require accommodating a disabled individual by bumping a more senior
employee, perhaps unless that would result in termination of the more senior employee,
would be necessary.
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award; under Pyett, the union may elect to arbitrate many of the
claims; and under the individual election system, the discriminatee
may often elect labor arbitration over litigation. Thus, under any of
these possibilities, though certainly most significantly under Pyett,
improving access to justice through labor arbitration is a worthy
goal.
Also worthy of future scholarly pursuit is consideration of
whether there are alternatives to modified mandatory labor arbitra-
tion of employment-discrimination disputes that further the same
goals-such as greater access to justice for those of lower education
and income, more efficient and less costly procedures, collective
action, and self-governance-yet provide more consistent or
publicly visible access to justice. For instance, perhaps mandatory
pre-dispute mediation, or an administrative agency or employment
court focusing on employment-discrimination claims, are alterna-
tives worthy of serious consideration.
CONCLUSION
The 160 labor arbitration awards examined show that labor arbi-
tration is a forum in which employment-discrimination claims can
be, and in many instances are, successfully resolved. These claims
were resolved, on average, in 503 days. The grievants worked in di-
verse positions that probably do not command high salaries, and all
were represented by an attorney or union agent at the arbitration
hearing. While more research certainly remains to be done, if the
data were representative 52 they would tentatively suggest that mod-
ified mandatory labor arbitration of discrimination claims can
provide access to justice, particularly if targeted legislative reforms
are enacted. Potential legislative reforms include mandating
greater discovery in certain cases, sanctioning arbitrators making
adverse inferences when witnesses fail to appear, guaranteeing the
applicability of statutory statutes of limitation, and commanding
that labor arbitrators consider the full range of statutory remedies.
Ultimately, whatever system of labor arbitration develops, improv-
ing access to justice through labor arbitration remains a worthy
goal.
352. The data are not representative. See supra Part II.
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APPENDIX
Wilcoxon nonparametric test performed with JMP version 3 SAS
Institute Cary, NC by Stanley Levinson.
REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL
Wilcoxon /Kruskal-Wallis Tests (Rank Sums)
ScoRE
Level Count SCORE SUM MEAN (MEAN-MEANO)/STD0
Employers 160 22240 139.000 -4.983
Unions 160 29120 182.000 4.983
2-Sample Test, Normal Approximation
S Z PROB>IZI
29120 4.98264 <.0001
1-way Test, Chi-Square Approximation
CHISQUARE DF PROB>CHISQ
24.8339 1 1 <.0001
ONLY ONE PARTY REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL
Wilcoxon /Kruskal-Wallis Tests (Rank Sums)
ScoRE
Level Count SCORE SUM MEAN (MEAN-MEANO)/STDO
Unions 160 28560 178.500 5.215
Employers 160 22800 142.500 -5.215
2-Sample Test, Normal Approximation
S Z PROBa>IZI
22800 -5.21504 <.0001
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COMPARATIVE WIN RATES IN LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
Wilcoxon /Kruskal-Wallis Tests (Rank Sums)
ScoRE
Level Count SCORE SUM MEAN (MFAN-MEANO)/STD0
Colvin AAA 1213 837484.5 690.424 3.098
Levinson 150 92081.5 613.877 -3.098
2-Sample Test, Normal Approximation
S Z jPO,>IZI
92081.5 -309820 0.0019
1-way Test, Chi-Square Approximation
CHISQuARE DF PROB>CHISQ
9.5998 1 0.0019
COMPARATIVE WIN RATES IN LABOR ARBITRATION AND STATE COURT
Wilcoxon /Kruskal-Wallis Tests (Rank Sums)
SCORE
Level Count SCORE SUM MEAN (MFAN-MEANO)/STD0
Eisenberg State 141 17935.5 127.202 -4.195
Levinson 149 24259.5 162.815 4.195
2-Sample Test, Normal Approximation
S Z PROB>IZI
17935.5 -4.19546 <.0001
1-way Test, Chi-Square Approximation
CHISQUARE DF PROB>CHISQ
17.6088 1 <.0001
COMPARATIVE WIN RATES IN LABOR ARBITRATION AND FEDERAL
COURT
Wilcoxon /Kruskal-Wallis Tests (Rank Sums)
ScORE (MEAN-MEANO)/
Level Count SCORE SUM MEAN STDO
Eisenberg Federal 1430 1125920.5 787.357 -0.858
Levinson 149 121489.5 815.366 0.858
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2-Sample Test, Normal Approximation
S Z PROB>IZI
121489.5 0.85766 0.3911
1-way Test, Chi-Square Approximation
CHISQUARE DF PROB>CHISQ
0.7358 1 0.3910
UNION AND EMPLOYER WIN RATES COMPARED
Wilcoxon /Kruskal-Wallis Tests (Rank Sums)
SCORE
Level Count SCORE SUM MEAN (MEAN-MEANO)/STD0
Employer 150 18675 124.500 -5.994
Union 150 26475 176.500 5.994
2-Sample Test, Normal Approximation
S Z PRO>IZI
26475 5.99366 <.0001
1-way Test, Chi-Square Approximation
CHISQUARE DF PROB>CHISQ
35.9332 1 >.0001
WIN RATE IN DISABILITY CASES AND IN OTHER CASES COMPARED
Wilcoxon /Kruskal-Wallis Tests (Rank Sums)
ScoPE
Level Count SCORE SUM MEAN (MEAN-MEANO)/STD0
ADA 92 6800 73.9130 -0.691
Other 58 4525 78.0172 0.691
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1-way Test, Chi-Square Approximation
CHISQUARE DF PROB>CHISQ
0.4811 1 0.4879
